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INTRODUCTION
Last year marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of compre-
hensive zoning1 in the United States and the sixty-fifth anni-
versary of the United States Supreme Court's approval of
zoning as a valid exercise of the police power in Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co.2 More specifically, Euclid upheld the
general principle of using the police power3 to separate incom-
patible uses and to protect residential uses and residential envi-
ronments from the pressures of growth and industrialization.
Relying on analogies to nuisance doctrine, Justice Sutherland
declared that "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."4
Thus, the concerns over health, safety, and the general welfare
that are embodied in the police power were properly extended
through the device of zoning to protect single-family residences
from the encroachment of commerce and industry.5
Prior to Euclid, municipalities had not only used zoning
and residential district laws to segregate uses deemed undesir-
able but also to mandate racially segregated residential pat-
terns.6 Notwithstanding judicial invalidation of many of these
1. The New York City Board of Estimate and Apportionment passed
what is generally agreed to be the first comprehensive or well-rounded zoning
ordinance on July 25, 1916. 3 PATRICK J. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CON-
TROLs § 1.02-2, at 1-8 & n.8 (1992); ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 754 (4th ed. 1982).
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Scholars consider Euclid to be the "leading case"
in the history of the law of zoning. See, e.g., 4 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN
M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER
§ 83.01, at 7 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1986); Richard A. Epstein, The Social Conse-
quences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1717, 1733 (1982) (referring
to Euclid as "the fons et origo of modern zoning law").
3. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. The Tenth Amendment's reservation of pow-
ers to the states acknowledges local governments' police power. ROGER A.
CUNNNGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2, at 516 (student ed. 1984). It
is the power "to promote and protect the public health, safety, morals, comfort
and general welfare of the people." Sinclair Ref. Co. v. City of Chicago, 178
F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1949).
4. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
5. Id. at 394-95. This form of protective "use" zoning is viewed as the
most common type of zoning. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C.
JUERGENMEYER, URBAN PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
§ 4.2, at 74 (2d ed. 1986). This perception is based on the wave of protective
use zoning that swept the nation between 1916 and 1930. Id. Euclid is the
most famous zoning case because it provided judicial validation of this practice.
Id. The term "Euclidean zoning" refers to this basic form of zoning. See
CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A. WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK
ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND REUSE OF URBAN LAND 372 (4th ed. 1989).
6. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in
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practices, significant segregated residential patterns remain as a
legacy of discriminatory zoning and land use planning.7
Although much litigation and scholarship has focused on
the myriad exclusionary zoning and land use planning devices
that are responsible for creating and perpetuating residential
segregation,8 another invidious legacy of Euclid has gone
largely unnoticed. Minority communities, which were often es-
tablished as separate communities as the result of discrimina-
tory zoning and planning devices, are then frequently deprived
of the land use protection basic to Euclidean zoning principles.9
the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice,
1990 U. I.L. L. REv. 763, 807-62 (examining state court precedents involving
municipal ordinances mandating segregated residential patterns in Virginia,
Maryland, Georgia, and North Carolina prior to Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917)); James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America An Historical and Legal
Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States,
22 How. L.J. 547, 561, 562 & n.34 (1979) (discussing the rise and fall of racial
zoning movement, and the emergence of restrictive covenants); see also 2 WIL-
LIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 59 (discussing racial zoning before and after
Buchanan).
7. Prior to the institution of racial zoning and other land use controls in
the early 1900s, residential patterns were relatively integrated. Kushner,
supra note 6, at 552 & n.10. The trend toward racial separation accelerated
after World War II. See id. at 561. By 1968, the Kerner Commission issued its
famous report finding that our nation was "moving toward two societies, one
black, one white-separate and unequal." KERNER COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968). The partially
reconstituted Kerner Commission found little change 20 years later. See Re-
port of the 1988 Commission on the Cities, The Kerner Report Updated, Race
and Poverty in the United States Today (1988) [hereinafter The Kerner Re-
port Updated] (on file with the Minnesota Law Review); see also John 0.
Calmore, To Make Wrong Right The Necessary and Proper Aspirations of
Fair Housing, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1989 77, 90-91 (1989) (noting
that rate and extent of change in residential segregation in the 1970s was "un-
remarkable"); Douglas B. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in
U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimen-
sions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373, 388 (1989) (showing that statistical data reveal per-
sistence and prevelance of residential segregation in America); Gary Orfield,
Separate Societies: Have the Kerner Commission Warnings Come True? (Feb.
29 1988) (unpublished paper paper prepared for the Wingspread Conference,
on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (answering the question asked in title
affirmatively). An early analysis of the 1990 census data reveals that black
residential segregation is as great now as it was in the 1960s. Margaret L.
Udansky, USA at Home: Streets Still Isolate Races, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 1991,
at IA.
8. See, e.g., JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING § 7.08 (1983 & Supp. 1991)
(collecting cases and observing "the extraordinary attention of scholars to the
problems of exclusionary zoning"); Kushner, supra note 6, at 590-98; see also 2
WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2, §§ 38.01-.22 (analyzing exclusionary zoning
cases).
9. See supra note 5 (defining "Euclidean zoning").
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Urban planner and professor Yale Rabin asks rhetorically:
Why is it that older black neighborhoods in many American cities are
frequently interspersed with land-uses ... which are intrusive, dis-
ruptive, even hazardous, and which degrade the residential environ-
ment? Is it because blacks were forced into these already hostile
surroundings by the pressures of segregation? Or have these incom-
patible activities somehow intruded into established black residential
neighborhoods isolated by segregation? There may well be some ex-
amples of blacks moving next to junkyards; but my own experience
suggests that the junkyard moving into black neighborhoods is the
more common pattern, and that zoning has played a prominent role in
the process.
10
Professor Rabin labeled the practice of superimposing in-
compatible zoning on communities of color "expulsive zoning,"
observing that the net effect of the practice is a piecemeal re-
placement of residents with the superimposed uses and their
owners.11  The imposition of incompatible zoning occurs
through lower-grade zoning or zoning authorizing noxious com-
mercial or industrial uses which undermine the quality of the
residential environment and discourage continued residencies.
Residents deprived of zoning protection are vulnerable to as-
saults on the safety, quality, and integrity of their communities
ranging from dangerous and environmentally toxic hazards to
more commonplace hazards, such as vile odors, loud noises,
blighting appearances, and traffic congestion.12
Higher-grade zoning, zoning or planning measures that in-
duce certain higher-quality residential or other uses can pro-
duce similar incompatible and disruptive results. These higher-
10. Yale Rabin, The Junkyard Nextdoor: Expulsive Zoning in Black
Neighborhoods 2 (Sept. 1, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11. See Yale Rabin, Ekpulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid,
in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101, 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S.
Kayden eds., 1989).
12. Even these commonplace incompatible and blighting uses can cause
significant damage to the integrity of residential communities. As Justice
Douglas observed
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than
spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate
the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cat-
tle.... They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community
which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.
The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer
may ruin a river.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); cf. KENNETH CLARK, DARK
GiH" o 32-33 (1965) (noting that "[h]ousing is no abstract social and political
problem, but an extension of man's personality. If the Negro has to identify
with a rat infested tenement, his sense of personal inadequacy and inferiority,
already aggravated by job discrimination and other forms of humiliation, is re-
inforced by the physical reality around him.").
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cost uses create market pressures that effectively price out ex-
isting low-income residents through the process of gentrifica-
tion.13  Residents subjected to incompatible upzoning face
the prospect of involuntary displacement and the functional
and psychological trauma of dislocation and perhaps
homelessness. 14
This Article explores the history, development, and legal
ramifications of government's failure to provide protective zon-
ing to low-income communities of color.15 Part I provides an
13. As Judge A. Leon Higginbotham explains:
Gentrification is a term used in land development to describe a trend
whereby previously "underdeveloped" areas become "revitalized" as
persons of relative affluence invest in homes and begin to "upgrade"
the neighborhood economically. This process often causes the evic-
tion of the less affluent residents who can no longer afford the in-
creasingly expensive housing in their neighborhood. Gentrification is
a deceptive term which masks the dire consequences that "upgrading"
of neighborhoods causes when the neighborhood becomes too expen-
sive for either rental or purchase by the less affluent residents who
bear the brunt of the change.
Business Ass'n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 874 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981);
see also Alschuler v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 515 F. Supp.
1212, 1223-24 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (discussing how gentrification increases housing
costs), aff'd, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982). For alternative definitions of this
phenomenon focusing on the often race-based implications of gentrification,
see Henry W. McGee, Jr., Afro-American Resistance to Gentrkfcation and the
Demise of Integrationist Ideology in the United States, 23 URB. LAW. 25, 29-30
(1991); Peter Marcuse, Gentrif'cation, Abandonment and Displacement: Con-
nections, Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 195, 198-99 (1985); and Alan M. White, Note, Gentrifzcation, Tipping
and the National Housing Policy, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 260
(1982-83).
14. Peter Marcuse, To Control Gentrifcation: Anti-displacement Zoning
and Planning for Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 931 (1984-85). See generally Marc Fried, Grieving For a Lost Home,
in THE URBAN CONDITION 151, 151-71 (Leonard J. Duhi ed., 1963) (describing
effects of forced dislocation resulting from urban renewal projects); Dennis J.
Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of Com-
munity, 25 IND. L. REV. 685 (1992) (same); Richard Lewis, Note, Destruction
of Community, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 365 (1986) (describing effects of urban re-
newal on communities).
15. The primary focus of this Article is the African-American or black
community due to the well-documented history of land use discrimination
against African-Americans sanctioned both by law and by custom. Because of
parallels between the treatment of blacks and hispanic or latino communities,
the effects of zoning on these other communities will be discussed where ap-
propriate. See infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text. Thus, the terms
"community of color" or "minority community" are used-for want of more
precise or illuminating terms to denote the impoverished, underserved com-
munities of low-income persons of color-to refer to African-American and
certain Hispanic-American communities. Cf. John 0. Calmore, Exploring the
Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REv.
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historical overview of this failure by examining the intertwined
judicial treatment of racial zoning and protective zoning, and
the major court decisions that influenced the proliferation of
segregative land use controls that have promoted and perpetu-
ated separate minority communities. The failure to respect and
protect the quality of the residential environment of these com-
munities is a by-product of separate land use policies, resulting
in the absence of zoning protection from diverse modern-day
land use threats ranging from the siting of environmental
hazards to the foreseeable development-induced displacement
of low-income residents. Part II evaluates the various constitu-
tional and statutory sources that support a right to protective
zoning to preserve the residential integrity of low-income com-
munities of color and to remedy the present day consequences
of past inequitable zoning.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. RACIAL ZONING
Although the earliest reported case of explicit racial zoning
involved San Francisco's expulsive anti-Chinese ordinance in
1890,16 the primary focus of early racial zoning provisions was
not expulsion but exclusion and the separation of the black and
white races. Shortly after the turn of the century, when legally
enforced segregation approached its zenith,17 several southern
and border cities enacted strict racial zoning ordinances
designating separate residential districts for whites and blacks.
Such ordinances were a response to the mass migration of
201, 217 (1982) ("The reference 'minority' has become ambiguously overinclu-
sive, now applicable to virtually all except the nonelderly, nonhandicapped,
nonalien, heterosexual, white male.").
16. See In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1890) (holding that ordinance
requiring all persons of Chinese descent to move out of a San Francisco neigh-
borhood within 60 days violated both the due process and equal protection
clauses, and treaties with China).
17. See generally JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 317-27
(4th ed. 1974) (noting that political abandoment, decreased employment, and
increased racial violence frustrated signs of change for blacks at the turn of
the century); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 84-110 (1976) (documenting
struggles of black civil rights leaders and intellectuals when "toxins of racism
flourished as never before."); HENRY L. MOON, THE EMERGING THOUGHT OF
W.E.B. DuBois 183-214 (1972); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEmMA
(1944) (examining causes of racial distrust from 1900-1950s); C. VANN WOOD-
WARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 97-118 (3d ed. 1974) (discussing ex-
pansion of Jim Crow laws in the early 1900s).
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southern rural blacks to the cities' 8 and to white residents'
fears of racial amalgamation.' 9 Baltimore passed the first such
ordinance in 1910 and within six years more than a dozen cities
followed suit.20
In 1917, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of racial zoning in Buchanan v. Warley in a challenge to a Lou-
isville, Kentucky ordinance.2 ' Although the Court invalidated
the Louisville ordinance, the peculiar facts of the case and the
limited holding rendered the decision more a pronouncement
on the primacy of property rights than a rejection of the prem-
ises underlying the enforced separation of the races.
In Buchanan, a white seller residing in a racially zoned
white district entered into a contract to sell his home to
Warley, a black buyer.22 The contract provided that Warley
would not have to purchase the property unless he had a right,
under law, to occupy the property as a residence.23 Buchanan
sued Warley for specific performance and Warley raised the
Louisville racial zoning ordinance as a defense. 24 Buchanan, in
turn, asserted that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and therefore
could not vitiate his otherwise valid contract.2 5
The Supreme Court specifically declined to invalidate ra-
cial zoning on equal protection grounds. Recognizing that the
express rationale for the ordinance was the preservation of ra-
cial purity, the court found that the case did not address rights
18. 2 Wn.LIAMs & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 59.03, at 735-36.
19. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before
Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 657. The same social science data on the superior-
ity of the white race purporting to justify early anti-miscegenation laws, pro-
vided the justification for racial zoning. Id. at 651-64.
In the first two decades of the twentieth century the popular hor-
ror of racial amalgamation reached its apogee. Progressive Era politi-
cians supported a wider role for government in social planning than
did their Guilded Age predecessors, and they looked for broader
methods of social control than mere antimiscegenation statutes. The
most obvious way to ensure separation was to force blacks and whites
to live in different places.
Id. at 657.
20. Id. at 657; see also Higginbotham et al., supra note 6, at 810-11; Roger
L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. Soc. HIsT. 179, 180-82
(1968).
21. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
22. Id. at 69-70. For a discussion of the collusive nature of this lawsuit,
see Higginbotham et al., supra note 6, at 851-52.
23. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 69-70.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 70.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
'concerning the "amalgamation of the races." 26 Rather, "[t]he
right which the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a
white man to dispose of his property ... to a person of color
and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white per-
son."27 As such, the ordinance was neither a valid exercise of
the police power nor an enactment consistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment's prohibition against "state interference
with property rights except by due process of law."28
B. THE EUCLID CASE AND THE CONCEPT OF PROTECTIVE
ZONING
Ironically, laws embodying benign, progressive applications
of zoning concepts were not enacted on a wide scale until after
the proliferation of racial zoning controls.29 In 1916, New York
enacted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance, separating
and protecting residential uses from incompatible commercial
and industrial uses. 30 Prior to the adoption of zoning, the com-
mon law tort of nuisance served as the primary device for pro-
tecting residents from the hazards of noise, odors, traffic, and a
plethora of other interferences with the comfort, health, safety,
and convenience of the community.31 Zoning offered the prom-
ise of institutionalizing the common law theory of nuisance and
providing comprehensive protection against threats to the resi-
dential environment in advance of their occurrence.32
The ordinance at issue in Euclid reflected these protection-
ist concerns. It established six classes of use districts, separat-
ing residential, commercial, and industrial uses as well as
certain uses within each category.33 The ordinance also regu-
lated building height and the land area required for each use.34
The land at issue was vacant and held by the Ambler Realty
26. Id at 81.
27. Id
28. Id. at 82.
29. See 2 WnLAMs & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 59.03, at 736 n.9.
30. 3 ROHAN, supra note 1, at 1-8 & n.8. The New York Court of Appeals
upheld the validity of this ordinance four years later. Lincoln Trust Co. v. The
Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920).
31. WRIGHT & GITELMAN, supra note 1, § 2.
32. See John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New
Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 32. Zoning offers many advan-
tages over the common law of nuisance, including the significant ability to
avoid case-by-case protracted litigation over each offending land use. See id
33. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1926).
34. Id
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Company for industrial development.s Because the ordinance
prohibited industrial use on most of this vacant land, the land
lost seventy-five percent of its value. Ambler Realty chal-
lenged the ordinance as a deprivation of property without due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
36
At least initially the Court's reasoning in Buchanan-ex-
pressing solicitude for the inviolability of private property
rights37 without questioning the white supremacist underpin-
nings of racial zoning3s-provided an impediment to the ap-
proval of protective zoning in Euclid. Indeed, because the
lower court judge in Euclid believed that the justifications for
the restraints on private property established through racial
zoning outweighed those for protective zoning, he invalidated
Euclid's zoning ordinance.39 He stated:
It seems to me that no candid mind can deny that more and stronger
reasons exist, having a real and substantial relation to the public
peace, supporting [the Louisville racial zoning ordinance in
Buchanan] than can be urged under any aspect of the police power to
support the present ordinance as applied to plaintiff's property ....
The blighting of property values and the congesting of population,
whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade a residential sec-
35. Idl at 384.
36. I&
37. The conflict over zoning arose in an era' when the Court's expansive
notions of substantive due process served to insulate private property owners
from the consequences of several forms of social welfare legislation enacted
under the states' police power. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (invalidating New York maximum hours labor law for bakery employ-
ees); see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 44445 (12th ed. 1991)
(from the Lochner decision in 1905 to the mid-1930s (the "Lochner era") the
Court invalidated nearly 200 laws on substantive due process grounds). For a
general overview of this period, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrITu-
TIONAL LAw 657-78 (2d ed. 1988). A Texas Supreme Court decision invalidat-
ing protective zoning, prior to Euclid, exemplifies the effect of the Lochner
legacy on zoning.
The right to acquire and own property, and to deal with it and use it
as the owner chooses, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural
right.... It is a part of the citizen's natural liberty--an expression of
his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate by every American Bill of Rights.
It is not a right, therefore, over which the police power is
paramount.
Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (Tex. 1921); see also SEYMOUR I.
TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 17 (1969) ("This question of [the limits of the police]
power was to be as decisive for the constitutional fate of zoning as it was for
the New York bakery legislation."); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Euclid' Lochner-
ian Legacy, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 11, at 278, 278-
85 (discussing the origins and development of zoning in Lochner Era).
38. See Hovenkamp, supra note 19, at 657.
39. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 312-13 (N.D. Ohio
1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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tion, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance. 40
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court without men-
tioning Buchanan. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Suther-
land first observed that if zoning ordinances were to be
sustained, they would have to be justified by "some aspect of
the police power asserted for the public welfare."41  He then
enunciated the standard by which the proper exercise of that
power would be determined: for a zoning ordinance to be de-
clared unconstitutional, it must be shown to be "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."42
Applying that standard to the ordinance at issue, Justice
Sutherland found the city's justifications "sufficiently cogent"
to survive constitutional scrutiny.43 In so doing he referred to
"comprehensive reports" that set out the empirical justification
for protective "use" zoning:
These reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking considera-
tion, concur in the view that the segregation of residential, business,
and industrial buildings will make it easier to provide fire apparatus
suitable for the character and intensity of the development in each
section; that it will increase the safety and security of home life;
greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by re-
ducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; de-
crease noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous
40. I& New Jersey courts relied on similar reasoning during this period
to invalidate protective zoning. See Ignaciunas v. Risley, 121 A. 783, 786 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, 125 A. 121 (N.J. 1924). The New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
The final argument advanced in favor of the ordinance is that
misplaced stores in the heart of a residential section often start a
blighted area.... It is true that in growing cities there are often cre-
ated what is termed "blighted areas." They may, in some instances,
have come from the placing of stores in residential sections. Blighted
areas, however, more frequently arise by the purchase in some resi-
dential section of a city of properties by members of a race different
in color or nationality from those who have been living in that section
which prompts the other residents in that section to move to other
sections of the city more congenial. An ordinance which would obli-
gate persons of different nationalities or religion or color to live in dif-
ferent and specified sections of a city would, we think, be held
unreasonable and discriminatory.
41. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
42. Id at 395. This formulation reflected the Court's merger of "the two
express constitutional restrictions on any state interference with private prop-
erty-that property shall not be taken without due process nor for a public
purpose without just compensation-into [this] single standard." Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
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disorders; preserve a more favorable environment in which to rear
children, etc.44
The Euclidean conception of protective use zoning-creat-
ing balkanized districts and categories of uses-has been widely
criticized over the years as rigid, overinclusive, unsophisticated,
and ill-suited to the realities of present-day urban develop-
ment.45 Nevertheless, the Euclidean concept of using the police
power to protect the quality of the residential environment
from the negative by-products of incompatible uses has perse-
vered both through zoning and through alternative, more so-
phisticated, land-use controls.4 6
C. RACIAL ZONING AND PLANNING POST-EUCLID
By extending the police power to protective "use" zoning,
the Supreme Court weakened the doctrinal underpinnings of
Buchanan. Several localities, emboldened by Euclid's libera-
tion of the police power and responding to the continuing fear
of racial amalgamation, embarked on a new round of racial zon-
44. Id. at 394. The Court also relied on the growing body of cases in the
lower courts upholding protective zoning as within the police power either to
protect residences from the presumptive nuisance of business and industry, or
merely to promote orderly municipal development. See id. at 390-93 (citing
cases). Compare State v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923)
("[A]ny business establishment is likely to be a genuine nuisance in a neigh-
borhood of residences. Places of business are noisy; they are apt to be dis-
turbing at night; some of them are malodorous; some are unsightly; some are
apt to breed rats, mice, roaches, flies, ants, etc.") with. City of Aurora v. Bums,
149 N.E. 784, 788 (I1. 1924) ("The exclusion of places of business from residen-
tial districts is not a declaration that such places are nuisances, or that they
are to be suppressed as such, but it is part of a general plan [to reduce the dis-
order and dangers inherent in unregulated municipal development.]").
45. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, Reflections on Eucli& Social Contract and
Private Purpose, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 11, at 347-
53; Luther L. McDougall, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Eu-
clidean Zoning?, 47 TuL. L. REv. 255, 255-57 nn.3-6 (1973); Mark S. Pulliam,
Brandeis Brief for Decontrol of Land Use: A Plea for Constitutional Reform,
13 Sw. L. REV. 435 (1983); see also infra note 74 (discussing impediments to
multi-family and subsidized housing).
46. ROBERT BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME REvIsrrED 263-64 (1985). Some
of the Supreme Court's modern day pronouncements on zoning include refer-
ences to the continued desirability and importance of protective zoning. See,
e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433 (1988)
(Stevens, J., and O'Conner, J.) ("Zoning is the process whereby a community
defines its essential character" and "ensures that neighboring uses of land are
not mutually--or more often unilaterally-destructive."); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Zoning] may
indeed be the most essential function performed by local government, for it is
one of the primary means by which we protect that sometimes difficult to de-
fine concept of quality of life.").
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ing in open defiance of Buchanan.47 Although the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Buchanan twice shortly after Euclid, it did so
in unusually short per curiam opinions that failed to supply
reasoning or moral suasion to the principled distinction be-
tween protective "use" zoning and apartheid.48 Thus, several
localities continued to enforce racial zoning ordinances for
many years thereafter.49
With the eventual decline of racial zoning, numerous alter-
47. Texas enacted a law authorizing all its municipalities to provide sepa-
rate residential districts based on race in March, 1927. See Tax. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1015-b (repealed 1969). The City of Dallas adopted a racial
zoning ordinance nine months later. See City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex
Corp., 19 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); see also Dowdell v. City of
Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (discussing City of Apopka,
Florida racial zoning ordinance enacted in 1937 and repealed in 1968), qff'd,
698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 6 S.E.2d 867,
868 (N.C. 1940) (invalidating Winston-Salem racial zoning ordinance enacted in
1930); Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Okla. 1935) (invalidating
Oklahoma City racial zoning ordinance enacted in 1933).
48. See Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam) (reversing Loui-
siana Supreme Court decision "on the authority of Buchanan"); City of Rich-
mond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (per curiam) (affirming decree that was
based on Buchanan and Harmon). The courts in Harmon and Deans noticed
the juxtaposition of potentially dissonant rationales in the Euclid and
Buchanan decisions. In Deans, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the six-word
opinion in Harmon as an indication that the Court's decision in Euclid did not
overrule Buchanan sub silentio. 37 F.2d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 1930). In Harmon,
the Louisiana Supreme Court relied in part on pre-Euclid decisions upholding
the extension of the police power to protective zoning to justify the validity of
racial zoning and Buchanan. See Tyler v. Harmon, 104 So. 200, 206-07 (La.
1925), rev'd per curiam, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
49. The city of Miami enacted a racial zoning ordinance in 1945. See State
v. Wilson, 25 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1946). The city of Birmingham attempted to de-
fend its racial ordinance all the way to the Supreme Court in 1951. See Monk
v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949), qff'd, 185 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951). The city of Kissimmee, Flor-
ida effectively enforced its racial zoning ordinance at least as late as 1947. See
Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 579 (M.D. Fla. 1986). The State
of Texas's racial district law remained on the books until 1969. See Walker v.
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 n.18 (E.D.
Tex. 1989). In Walker, the court observed that the city of Dallas admitted in
1988 that the racial zoning laws "established 'racially segregated housing pat-
terns [that] have not yet been fully eradicated'... ." Id. at 1294 n.18.; see also
Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280-88 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (noting that
1914 city ordinance prohibiting racial "intermingling" remained on the books
until 1975 and contributed to pattern of black residences on "the other side of
the tracks" still present in 1984), aff'd per curiam, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir.
1986); cf. Dowdell, 511 F. Supp. at 1378 ("Although there is little evidence that
the [1937 racial zoning] ordinance [repealed in 1968] was enforced by the City,
there is some evidence that its existence persuaded blacks to dispose of real
property owned by them on the northern side of the railroad tracks.").
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native segregative land use controls flourished. The use of ra-
cially restrictive covenants mushroomed during the 1930s and
1940s, particularly in the northern, western, and mid-western
regions of the country.50 This practice was consistent with
Buchanan's limited freedom of contract rationale and initially
enjoyed at least tacit Supreme Court approval.51 Notwithstand-
ing the Supreme Court's later extension of the state action con-
cept to judicial enforcement of these covenants and its
concomitant invalidation of the practice on equal protection
grounds in 1948,52 white property owners continued to attempt
to enforce these covenants up to the early 1960s.53 The present
day segregative consequences of this practice are manifest.M
The federal government was also deeply involved in the de-
velopment of discriminatory land use policies. The Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administra-
tion (VA), which provided mortgage insurance to enable low,
moderate, and middle-income families to obtain low- or no-
down-payment mortgages, adopted policies promoting segrega-
tion in insured housing.55 The FHA Underwriting Manual in
50. See 2 WI.LLAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 60.01; Kushner, supra note
6, at 563 & nn.37-39.
51. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (dismissing challenge
of racial covenants for want of jurisdiction).
52. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The fact that three sitting
Supreme Court Justices in Shelley were required to recuse themselves due to
their ownership of homes covered under covenants underscorces the wide-
spread approval of racial covenants. See 2 WILIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2,
at 754. Indeed, nearly 40 years later, the sitting Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, William Rehnquist, still owned a home with racially restrictive cove-
nants. See Grover Hankins, Causes of Residential Segregation, Other Views,
in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS: A CONFERENCE AT YALE
LAW SCHOOL 55, 56 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1988).
53. See, e.g., Harrison v. Tucker, 342 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (re-
versing lower court injunction against showing or selling home to black family
based on racial covenant); Gast v. Gorek, 211 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961)
(suggesting the availability of damage action for violation of racial covenant
notwithstanding the rejection of damage actions for violations of such cove-
nants eight years earlier in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)). See gen-
erally 2 WILAms & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 60.05 (describing "subterfuges"
used to circumvent problems encountered in enforcing racial covenants).
54. For example, racial covenants were employed extensively or with stra-
tegic location in Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis and Philadelphia, among other cit-
ies. See ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 246-47 (1948). In 1990, these
cities ranked first, eighth, tenth, and twelfth respectively in African-American
residential segregation. By the Numbers, Tracking Segregation in 219 Cities,
USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 1991, at 3A.
55. See Robert W. Collin & Robin A. Morris, Racial Inequality In Ameri-
can Cities: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 177, 182-83
(1989); Kushner, supra note 6, at 567-69 & nn.48-51; Leonard S. Rubinowitz &
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use from 1934 to 1947 counselled against "the infiltration of in-
harmonious racial and national groups," "a lower class of in-
habitants," and "the presence of incompatible racial elements"
in new housing.56 The FHA also encouraged the use of racial
covenants and denied mortgage insurance to entire "redlined"57
black and integrated neighborhoods based on the belief that
black residents caused a devaluation of property.58
Although the FHA adopted a policy of equal opportunity
by the early 1950s, it did not even begin to address its acquies-
cence in the discriminatory practices of participating private
lenders until 1968.59 Because the FHA and VA programs subsi-
dize nearly one-half of all mortgaged homes, the consequences
of their long-term practices are widespread.60
While the federal homeownership assistance programs pro-
moted the creation of homogeneous white suburbs, the federal
public housing program for low-income families with children
facilitated the development of segregated and locationally defi-
cient black inner city neighborhoods. From the public housing
program's inception in 1937,61 tenants were assigned to projects
Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream: Imple-
menting Fair Housing Policies In Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw.
U. L. REV. 491, 510-21 (1979). Congress enacted the FHA program in 1934 in
the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), "to rescue the failing home fi-
nance industry from the depths of the Depression by assuming the risk of loss
for mortgage lending institutions." Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra, at 494.
Congress created the VA program in the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (codifed as amended in scattered sections
of 38 U.S.C.), to help war veterans own their own homes through mortgage in-
surance provisions similar to the FHA program and through direct loans to
veterans. Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra, at 498 n.28.
56. Collin & Morris, supra note 55, at 182.
57. Redlining "denotes the practice of denying mortgage financing on
property located within certain geographic areas of a city." Marcia Duncan et
al., Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighbor-
hood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. L. 510, 513 (1975). A
lender would literally draw a red line on a city map around the community or
area declared off-limits for mortgage investment. See Citizen's Commission on
Civil Rights, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 297 (Rachel G. Bratt et
al. eds., 1986).
58. Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 55, at 512-13.
59. I& at 521. Similarly, while the post-war VA program had adopted a
policy of racial neutrality, the agency did not attempt to stop lenders whose
loans it guaranteed from discriminating on the basis of race. Id at 514 n.88.
60. See Kushner, supra note 6, at 568 (asserting that "[t]hese policies....
guaranteed that Blacks would remain in the central cities.").
61. The United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437s (1988)).
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on a segregated basis, with many black projects located in
slums. 62 When the program's production goals were greatly ex-
panded in the United States Housing Act of 1949,63 Congress
virtually guaranteed that all new housing would continue to be
constructed on a discriminatory basis when it rejected anti-dis-
crimination amendments to the Act.6
Although Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed
discrimination in publicly funded programs,6 the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) did not promulgate
regulations requiring the siting of new housing in viable neigh-
borhoods and on a non-segregated basis until 1972.66 This leg-
62. Kushner, supra note 6, at 577 n.65 (citing WEAVER, supra note 54, at
73-74, 143-44); Comment, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selec-
tion and the Failure of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1330, 1331 (1974);
see Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (upholding public
housing segregation as an extension of the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
63. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-1490o (1988)). The Act defined "the realization as soon as feasible of
the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every Ameri-
can family" as a national policy priority. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
64. Elizabeth K. Julian & Michael M. Daniel, Separate and Unequal-The
Root and Branch of Public Housing Segregation, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 666,
668-69 (1989) (citing 95 CONG. REc. 4791-98, 4849-61 (1949)). In their successful
advocacy against the amendments, congressional liberals argued that challeng-
ing racial segregation in public housing would instigate rejection of the public
housing provisions of the 1949 Act and thereby deny black families much
needed housing-even though that housing would be provided on a racially
segregated basis. Id
65. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1988)). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's invalidation of
the "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), the federal government continued a formal policy of segregation in
public housing tenant selection and assignments until President Kennedy's
Executive Order 11,063 in 1962. See 3 C.F.R. § 652 (1962). In interpreting and
applying this Executive Order, the government exempted existing projects, es-
chewed litigation as a means to enforce the Order, ignored local housing au-
thorities' "widespread policy of siting new housing projects in racially
identifiable neighborhoods," and then assigned tenants to correspond with the
neighborhoods' demographics. "[Tihere is no evidence of any public housing
desegregation before 1964." David W. Price, Note, Causation of Public Hous-
ing Segregation: HUD Authorization of Applicant Choice in Tenant Selection
and Assignment Plans, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121, 130 (1990).
66. The Third Circuit's decision in Shannon v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1970), mandated that HUD
develop an institutionalized method of site selection to assure compliance with
the civil rights laws. HUD promulgated site selection regulations. 24 C.F.R.
§ 941.202 (1992) (public housing); 24 C.F.R. § 880.206 (1992) (subsidized hous-
ing). See generally Steven Lev, HUD Site and Neighborhood Selection Stan-
dards: An Easing of Placement Restrictions, 22 URB. L. ANN. 199 (1981)
(examining the development of HUD's current standards for site selection);
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acy of discrimination resulted in the current prevalence of
separate and inferior public housing for low-income African-
American families.67
Another initiative of the 1949 United States Housing Act,
the Federal Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal Program, s
further exacerbated black land use inequality. Designed for
the ostensibly benign purpose of eliminating urban blight, fed-
eral slum clearance uprooted and dislocated thousands of black
households and then confined the displacees to segregated and
inferior relocation housing.6 9 Federal highway projects pro-
Michael J. Veranelli, Where Should HUD Locate Assisted Housing?, in Hous.
ING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL PoLIcY 214, 214-34 (John Goering ed., 1986)
(tracking HUD's attempts at promoting fair housing through site selection).
67. Julian & Daniel, supra note 64, at 669. Just one year after HUD
promulgated site selection regulations, the HUD secretary announced a mora-
torium on construction of many HUD subsidized housing programs, even
though Congress had appropriated funds for those programs. See Penn-
sylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding the moratorium).
While the moratorium did not, by its terms, include public housing, it signalled
a federal retreat from the broad goals of the 1949 Housing Act which extended
to all HUD housing programs for low and moderate income families. In the
mid-1970s public housing production was at its lowest levels since the 1949 Act,
and it came to a virtual halt in the mid to late 1980s. See Rachel G. Bratt,
Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribution, in CRmIcAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 57, at 335, 338-41; see also CENTER FOR COMMU-
NITY CHANGE, PUBLIC HOUSING UNDER SIEGE: A SPECIAL ISSUE 3-5 (1989)
(detailing failure of government to modernize, repair, and build public housing
in cities); NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL 9
(1990) (describing loss of public housing units). A significant portion of public
housing units standing today were planned and constructed with the federal
government's full knowledge that these units would provide separate and in-
ferior housing for low-income black families. See Discrimination in Federally
Assisted Housing Programs: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Hous-
ing and Community Development, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 80-98 (Nov. 21,
1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John J. Knapp, Gen. Counsel,
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.); Craig Flourney & George Ro-
drigue, Separate and UnequaL" Illegal Segregation Pervades Nation's Subsi-
dized Housing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10-18, 1985.
An increasing body of case law underscores the government's complicity
in the provision of inferior housing for blacks. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
U.S. 284 (1976); see also infra note 248 (discussing relevant cases).
68. United States Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, §§ 101-110, 63
Stat. 413, 414-21. This program was replaced by Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §§ 101-118, 88 Stat.
633, 633-653 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1988)). The 1974
Act consolidated several grant programs into the Community Development
Block Grant program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1988).
69. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 8.12 (3d
ed. 1992); Chester W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief,
57 VA. L. REv. 745 (1971); Kushner, supra note 6, at 583-86; Henry W. McGee,
Urban Renewal in the Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 VA. L. REV. 826 (1970);
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duced similar results.70
Local governments' exclusionary zoning laws remain a sig-
nificant ongoing land use planning impediment to African-
American residential mobility.7 1 These zoning enactments cre-
ate financial barriers to residential access virtually as effective
in operation as the explicitly racial laws invalidated in
Buchanan. Exclusionary zoning and planning techniques have
been described as both "innumerable and interchangeable" 72
and include a plethora of devices that increase the cost of hous-
ing 73 impede the development of low-cost or subsidized hous-
see also MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF URBAN RENEWAL 1949-1962 (1964) (examining and critiquing the effect of
federal slum clearance projects); Peter Marris, A Report on Urban Renewal in
the United States, in TiE URBAN CONDITION 113, 119 (Leonard J. Duhl ed.,
1963) ("80 per cent of the families relocated are non-white .... Few, if any, of
the families relocated could afford the private housing planned to replace their
old homes.").
Courts have also recognized the disparate consequences of federal urban
renewal on black communities. See, e.g., Garrett v. Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp.
16, 25-27 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (urban renewal labelled "negro removal"), rev'd in
part, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974); cf. Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d
687 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge displace-
ment of minority communities by urban redevelopment); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that plaintiff may
raise equal protection challenge to urban renewal program which allegedly
displaced minorities in disporportionate numbers).
70. BELL, supra note 69, § 8.12; Kushner, supra note 6, at 583-86; Neal A.
Roberts, Homes, Roadbuilders, and the Courts: Highway Relocation and Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Action, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 55 (1972); see also
Alice A. Ratliff & Michael D. Calhoun, Use of Last Resort Housing Benefits
and Redevelopment Powers to Preserve a Low-Income Community Threatened
with Displacement, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 442, 443 (1988) (describing suc-
cessful fight of low-income black community to prevent complete displace-
ment).
For judicial recognition of the racial impacts of highway projects compare
Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1988) (removing rezoning impedi-
ments to the construction of relocation housing for minority displacees), cert
denied sub nom. City of Hawthorne v. Wright, 493 U.S. 813 (1989) with Nash-
ville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179, 185 (6th Cir. 1967) (deny-
ing injunction against highway project despite showing of "heavy damage" to
the black community), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
71. Exclusionary zoning has been defined as "zoning that raises the price
of residential access to a particular area, and thereby denies that access to
members of low-income groups." Lawrence G. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Ex-
clusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767,
767 (1969).
72. RICHARD F. BABCOCK & FRED P. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING,
LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970s 7 (1973).
73. These devices include the imposition of minimum lot sizes, minimum
building sizes, luxury amenity requirements, and even minimum dwelling cost.
See 2 WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2, §§ 62-66; BABCOCK & BOSSELmAN,
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ing,7 4 or preclude or discourage residential housing altogether.75
Because of the historic and continuing disproportionately
low income and wealth levels of African-American house-
holds,7 6 these zoning devices present seemingly insurmountable
obstacles to residential access to all but a handful. Indeed,
courts have recognized the racially disparate consequences of
these practices.77
supra note 72, at 3-17; KUSHNER, supra note 8, § 7.08. As late as 1972, the FHA
encouraged the use of "protective covenant[s] establishing a minimum dwell-
ing cost of quality and size [to maintain property values and ensure that] pro-
tection is afforded to desirable dwellings from the encroachment of buildings
below the standards of residential character originally established." 2 WIL-
LIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 62.02, at 781 (quoting Data Sheet 40,
Rev.4/59, p.3., which contained FHA's recommendation for "protective
covenants").
74. Examples of such devices include direct restrictions against or refer-
enda prerequisites to the development of multi-family or subsidized housing,
limits on the number of bedrooms or bathrooms in permissible multi-family
units, and provisions mandating developments for senior citizens. See gener-
ally 2 WILLAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 64.01; BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN,
supra note 72, at 7; KUSHNER, supra note 8, § 7.08. The exclusion of multi-
family units from neighborhoods of detached, single-family homes through
zoning measures is long-standing and has its genesis in Euclid. See Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (upholding the exclusion
of apartment houses from the single family district). Recognition of the value
of the concept of protective Euclidean zoning persists. See BABCOCK, supra
note 46, at 263-64. Scholars and jurists, however, increasingly have repudiated
the portion of Euclidean protective zoning which authorized the blanket exclu-
sion of apartments from neighborhoods of single-family homes as inconsistent
with the general welfare. See 3 WIIJAMs & TAYLOR, supra note 2, § 66.14 &
n.54; infra note 293 and accompanying text.
75. See BABcoCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 72, at 9-10. These practices
include overzoning for industrial, commercial, or agricultural use. Id.
76. According to 1990 Census Bureau figures, African-American families
are approximately three times as likely to have incomes below the poverty
line as white families. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE U.S. (Ta-
ble 2) (1990); see also CENTER ON BUDGET, AND POLICY PRIORTIEs, STmL FAR
FROM THE DREAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BLACK INCOME, EMPLOYMENT
AND POVERTY 17 (1988) ("By 1987, the typical black family's income equalled
just 56.1 percent of the typical white family's income."). In addition,
Blacks are still very unequally represented among homeowners, even
after controlling for differences in income. Since equity in a home is
the only substantial wealth of most families this helps account for the
fact that the typical white family had eleven times more wealth than
the typical black family in the mid-1980s, a gap radically larger than
the black-white income and employment gaps.
ORFIELD, supra note 7, at 15-16. Without the equity trade-in value of an ex-
isting home, black families' abilities to purchase a new home are greatly di-
minished. Karl Taueber, The Contemporary Context of Housing
Discrimination, 6 YALE L. & PO.'Y REV. 339, 34445 (1988).
77. See infra note 217 and cases cited therein.
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D. SEPARATE COMMUNITIES: UNEQUAL ZONING PROTECTION
Discriminatory zoning practices have created and perpetu-
ated separate residential communities for African-Americans.78
Although segregation in employment, public accommodations,
78. The persistence of discrimination by private realtors, brokers, land-
lords, and other private parties also contributes to the perpetuation of segre-
gated residential patterns. See John Yinger, The Racial Dimension of Urban
Housing Markets in the 1980s, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS 43, 43-47 (Gary A.
Tobin ed., 1987). Both HUD and private audit studies employing "testers" or
auditors of different races and ethnic backgrounds to seek housing in various
markets demonstrate this pattern of discrimination. See id, at 50-60; The Costs
of Housing Discrimination and Segregation: An Interdisciplinary Social Sci-
ence Statement, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra, at 268, 271 (discussing
1979 HID study sampling market behavior in 40 cities which "found a high
probability that a black family would encounter at least one case of readily
measurable discrimination in the course of a typical housing search."); see also
MARGARET A. TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRMNATION STUDY iii-i (1991)
(25-city study conducted for HUD in 1989 found an approximate 60 percent
probability of discrimination against black homebuyers).
The prospect of social isolation, harassment, or violence in white neigh-
borhoods is another impediment to African-American residential mobility. See
Wilhelmina A. Leigh & James P. McGee, A Minority Perspective on Residen-
tial Racial Integration, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 31,
37 (John Goering ed., 1986); Taueber, supra note 76, at 345. See generally ROB-
ERT F. FORMAN, BLACK GHETos, WHITE GHETTOS, AND SLUMS 96-100 (1971)
(discussing informal means by which neighborhoods remain segregated);
CHARLES ABRAMs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 81-90 (1955) (documenting violence
blacks encountered when moving into white cities). Acts of intimidation and
harassment against in-coming African-American families persist into the
1990s, and have sparked a debate about the ability of government to provide
enhanced punishment against such racially-motivated conduct. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating state cross-burn-
ing prosecution on First Amendment grounds); United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d
952 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding federal civil rights cross-burning conviction);
United States v. Hayward, 767 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same). See gener-
ally SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, HATE VIOLENCE AND WHITE
SUPREMACY: A DECADE REVIEW 1980-1990 (1989) (documenting over 50 cross-
burnings directed at African-American households in 1988-1989).
These practices may explain the similar segregation between middle-in-
come and lower-income African-American families. See Calmore, supra note
7, at 94-95. While there has been significant migration of African-American
middle-class families from lower-income central city areas, these families often
resettle in "spillover" African-American suburbs. See id. at 92; Gary Orfield,
Minorities and Suburbanization, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING,
supra note 57, at 221, 221-25. Compare WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISAD-
VANTAGED 56-62 (1987) (discussing the "exodus" of middle- and working-class
black families from the central city "ghettos" and the isolation of the "under-
class" left behind) with Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation
and the Making of the Underclass, 96 Ai. J. Soc. 329, 330-31 (1990) (suggesting
that the degree of black middle-class migration from central city areas is over-
stated and that persistent discrimination and residential segregation are far
more critical in the emergence of a black "underclass").
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education,7 9 and other aspects of American life have lessened
somewhat, residential separation in 1990 has remained at essen-
tially the same levels as in the 1960s.8 0
Because government-approved, or de jure, segregation had
its genesis in theories of white supremacy, it is not surprising
that de facto inequality often followed separateness. Put an-
other way, if "Jim Crow" placed a badge of inferiority on the
black race,"' it provided license to devalue black interests as
79. The persistence of residential segregation has contributed to the
resegregation of schools which have gone from court-supervised desegregation
plans to neighborhood school systems. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Okla. City
Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 645 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is
undisputed that replacing the Finger Plan with a system of neighborhood
school assignments... resulted in a system of racially identifiable schools.");
Riddick by Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 497 U.S. 938 (1987); see also The Kerner Report Updated,
supra note 7, at 9 ("After declining from 1968 to 1976, the number of black
students enrolled in predominantly minority schools increased from 62.9 per-
cent in 1980 to 63.5 percent in 1984").
80. See Drew S. Days, M, Introductory Remarks, in The Fair Housing Act
After Twenty Years, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 332, 332-33 (1988) (contrasting
the improvement in employment opportunities through Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the virtual elimination of segregation in public accommoda-
tions through Title II of the Act, and the increase in black political participa-
tion attributable to the Voting Rights Act 1965, with the failure of Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act) to improve significantly
the housing opportunities of African-Americans). The federal government's
Fair Housing Act enforcement effort has been described as an "oxymoron."
See James A. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda, The Federal Fair Housing En-
forcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y Rxv. 348, 348 (1988) (criticizing the fed-
eral government's efforts to enforce the FRA in light of its historic role in
"segregating the nation, resisting the dismantlement of apartheid, and ignoring
pervasive patterns of housing discrimination"). Moreover, because of the sig-
nificant federal role in creating and perpetuating residential segregation and
land use inequality, a federal enforcement effort designed to remedy many of
these conditions could be precluded by conflict of interest. Cf United States v.
Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (black interven-
ors joined HUD as defendant in action initiated by the Department of Justice
against City of Yonkers challenging segregation of public housing and public
schools), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
In addition, civil rights organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), perhaps drained by litigation battles, did not in-
itiate a nationwide litigation campaign to enforce the Fair Housing Act as they
had done with other new civil rights enactments. See Memorandum from
Lowell Johnston, First Associate Counsel, LDF to Julius Chambers, Director-
Counsel, LDF (Sept. 10, 1984) (on file with author); see also DAVID H. MoSKO-
WITZ, ExcLusIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 1, 1 (1977) ("[Tlhere has not been a
key organization such as the NAACP planning, financing and supervising [ex-
clusionary zoning] litigation.").
81. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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well. Thus, while the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson8 2
inaugurated the "separate but equal" doctrine, the Court failed
to define the equality component of separate facilities. Just
three years after Plessy, as Professor Derrick Bell observed,
"the Court dashed expectations that it would seriously enforce
the 'equal' part of its 'separate but equal' standard" when it up-
held the closure of a school board's only black high school as a
budgetary measure while the board continued to operate a
white high school.8 3
"Separate" has also meant "unequal" in the land use area.
Indeed, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in upholding the racial
zoning ordinance at issue in Buchanan, specifically acknowl-
edged that the ordinance might confine blacks to less desirable
parts of the city.84 Nevertheless, it casually dismissed the claim
of residential inequality, reasoning simply that "if such separa-
tion should result in the members of the colored race being re-
stricted to residence in the less desirable portions of the city,
they may render those portions more desirable through their
own efforts, as the white race has done."8 5
In his dissent in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia's decision upholding the validity of racial covenants,
Judge Edgerton observed that the effect of these purportedly
neutral covenants was to restrict blacks to inferior housing.8 6
He stated:
It has been contended that enforcement of covenants which exclude a
race from a neighborhood does not involve discrimination because it
permits reciprocity. This amounts to saying that if Negroes are ex-
cluded from decent housing they may retaliate by excluding whites
from slums. Such reciprocity is not only imaginary and unequal but
irrelevant.8 7
Inequality also followed separateness in the public housing
program. A Pulitzer Prize winning investigative report in The
82. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83. BELL, supra note 69, at 537 (citing Cumming v. Richmond County Bd.
of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899)); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 454-56 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's uneven and detri-
mental treatment of "equal"); Louis HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1968);
Annotation, Equivalence of Educational Facilities Extended by Public School
Systems to Members of White and Members of Colored Race, 103 A.L.R. 713
(1936) (explaining how courts apply the "separate but equal" standard).
84. Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472, 476 (Ky. 1915), rev'd sub
nom. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
85. Id.
86. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
87. Id.
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Dallas Morning News spurred extensive congressional hear-
ings. 5 The hearings, held in November, 1985 and January,
1986, concluded:
In a 14-month investigation of the country's 60,7 federally subsi-
dized rental developments, The Dallas Morning News visited 47 cities
across the nation and found that virtually every predominantly white-
occupied housing project was significantly superior in condition, loca-
tion, services and amenities to developments that house mostly blacks
and hispanics.
The news did not find a single locality in which federal rent-sub-
sidy housing was fully integrated or in which services and amenities
were equal for whites and minority tenants living in separate
projects.89
Apart from land use controls that placed blacks in residen-
tially inferior environments, governments have also engaged in
practices that diminish the quality of life for the residents
within African-American communities.90 These practices in-
clude the provision of inferior municipal services,91 selective
use of annexation and boundary line changes to disenfranchise
and deny services to black residents, 92 inequitable relocation or
88. Hearings, supra note 67.
89. Craig Flournoy & George Rodrigue, Separate and Unequak Illegal
Segregation Pervades Nation's Subsidized Housing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 10, 1985, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 67, at 22; see also Hearings,
supra note 67, at 20 (letter of Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez to HUD Secretary Sa-
muel Pierce, Feb. 26, 1985, indicating intention of subcommittee to hold hear-
ings on the "serious charges" made by the Dallas Morning News).
90. In public housing, these practices involve both site selection in resi-
dentially inferior locations and inequitable provision of services and mainte-
nance. See, e.g., Walker v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F.
Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (finding that housing authority deliberately lo-
cated public housing in "Negro slum areas"); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of In-
dian Trails Apts. v. Indian Trails Apts., 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See
generally Hearings, supra note 67, at 24 (detailing the superior services and
amenities provided to whites in public housing); Julian & Daniel, supra note
64, at 667 (describing inequities that black families face in public housing).
91. Service deficiencies typically involve street paving and lighting, sur-
face water drainage, sewers, water mains and fire hydrants, parks and recrea-
tional facilities, and police, fire, sanitation and public utility services. See, e.g.,
Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983-84 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Haw-
kins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on reh g per curiam,
461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc). See generally PAUL R. DImOND, A DI-
LEMMA OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT: DISCRIMINATION IN THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC
SERVICES (1978) (examining causes of and remedies for the discriminatory pro-
vision of public services).
92. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987);
Ammons, 783 F.2d at 985; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184-85. See generally Donald
G. Hagman, The Use of Boundary Lines to Discriminate in the Provision of
Services by Race, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 849 (1977) (analyzing cases of boundary
line discrimination in the provision of services); Ilene Dubrow, Municipal An-
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non-location of important public institutions,93 regressive and
disparate property tax assessments,94 encouragement of mort-
gage and insurance redlining,95 and the disproportionate dis-
placement of African-American families through urban
renewal, highway, and local redevelopment projects.9
The disparate denial of protective zoning to African-Ameri-
can communities is another unequal vestige of segregative land
use controls. While few cases have directly challenged the lack
of protective zoning, numerous cases refer to the prevalence of
incompatible uses and zoning in African-American residential
areas. In a 1937 case in Alexandria, Virginia, a brickmaker
seeking industrial zoning of an eighteen-acre lot for a clay pit
argued that such zoning would be consistent with the non-resi-
dential character of the area as evidenced, in part, by the pres-
ence directly to the south of a warehouse, some small
industries, and a "colored settlement."97
A few years later, a California appellate court in O'Rourke
v. Teeters98 offered further insight into the practice of incom-
patible uses and zoning. In this case, a black business owner
challenged the enforcement of a protective zoning ordinance in
his Los Angeles neighborhood. The city ordinance had zoned
his neighborhood residential, thereby preventing him from op-
erating an electric shop business from his home.99 Ironically,
tagonism or Benign Neglect. Racial Motivations in Municipal Annexations in
St. Louis County, Missouri, 53 U. DET. J. URB. L. 245 (1975).
93. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); see
also Cassandra Q. Butts, The Color of Money: Barriers to Access to Private
Health Care Facilities for African-Americans, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 159,
161-62 (1992) (discussing relocation of hospitals away from black communities);
cf. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan for Fair Employment Plant Loca-
tion in White Suburbia, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 383 (1971) (discussing location of
public and private employment facilities away from black communities).
94. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (11th Cir.
1984); Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 977
(1976). See generally Kenneth A. Baar, Property Tax Assessment Discrimina-
tion Against Low Income Neighborhoods, 13 URB. LAw. 333 (1981) (discussing
the historical and political origins of discriminatory assessment, relevant case
law, and stategies to combat the problem).
95. See Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 55, at 512-13.
96. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text; see also Larramore v. Il-
linois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 449-51 (N.D. IM. 1989). See gen-
erally Nat'l Econ. Dev. & Law Ctr., Facing the Local Redevelopment Agency,
24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1051 (1991) (analyzing the potentially disruptive con-
sequences of local redevelopment agencies' activities on communities of color).
97. West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 193 S.E. 881, 883-84 (1937).
98. 146 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
99. Id at 984 & n.1.
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the plaintiff argued, and the court found, that he could not ob-
tain a suitable alternative location for his business due to "race
restrictions" in private covenants.100 The plaintiff also argued
that the presence of two pre-existing commercial establish-
ments on his block, a planing mill within five hundred feet, un-
zoned areas nearby, and heavy traffic in front of the home
rendered the area non-residential in character, thereby under-
mining the residential designation.101
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court provided what is
possibly the only judicial statement recognizing the importance
of zoning equity within low-income minority communities. Af-
ter holding that the mere existence of some commercial uses,
unzoned areas, or heavy traffic do not per se abrogate the resi-
dential character of a neighborhood-and implicitly suggesting
that these elements were characteristic of black and low-in-
come neighborhoods-the court stated:
Any other conclusion would result in a situation where only those
who have been so fortunate as to obtain enough worldly goods to en-
able them to erect their homes in districts beyond the possible ap-
proach of commercial enterprises could be protected in their
residences from the encroachment of business, commercial, and man-
ufacturing enterprises. It needs no argument to support the thesis
that all classes of our citizens, rich and poor, of whatever race or
creed, are entitled to the equal protection of our laws and the privi-
lege of living in areas which have been properly zoned for residential
purposes pursuant to the recommendation of a duly created planning
commission.102
Later cases suggest that the O'Rourke court's "thesis" on
equality of protective zoning was not as assiduously followed by
city planners when its application conflicted with majoritarian
interests. Incompatible zoning was employed as a "subtler" de-
vice in pursuit of segregation as compared to the invalidated de-
vices of racial zoning and restrictive covenants.10 3 City planners
deliberately displaced black residences with industrial and com-
mercial zoning10 4 or used incompatible zoning to confine black
100. Id. at 984.
101. Id. at 984-85.
102. IM at 985. The court noted that "[i]f the present judgment were to be
sustained, such protection, instead of being extended to the Caucasian and Ne-
gro population, rich and poor alike, would be confined and reserved to the few
wealthy residents of Los Angeles." Id
103. See Charles Abrams, The Housing Problem and the Negro, in THE NE-
GRO AMERICAN 512, 516 (Tom Parsons & Kenneth Clark eds., 1965).
104. See Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 21-22 (E.D. Mich.
1971) (finding "that governmental activities ... during the 1960s, including in-
dustrial expansion into residential areas .... have resulted in removal of sub-
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residents to particular portions of a city. 0 5
In other cases the relatively common practice of overzon-
ing for industrial use due to the income-generating potential of
industrial development (and the wishful thinking of city plan-
ners)1°6 may have formed the impetus behind the disparate de-
nial of protective zoning. As Professor Rabin observed in his
twelve-city study of expulsive zoning, "where those grandiose
[industrial development] expectations exceeded the capacity of
existing vacant land, they were often superimposed on devel-
oped black residential areas.' 0 7 In Charlotte, North Carolina,
for example, Judge McMillan in the course of the Swann
school desegregation litigation found that "nearly all industrial
land in the City" is in the black community and "[m]any black
citizens live in areas zoned industrial which means that the
zoning law places no restriction on the use of the land.' 0 8
Similarly, in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey, in the course of
stantial numbers of black persons from the defendant City"); Rabin, supra
note 11, at 108 (referencing accounts of intentional displacement of black resi-
dences in Baltimore and St. Louis through industrial and commercial zoning).
105. For example, Charles Abrams recounts that when the Ford Motor
Company moved its plant from Richmond, California to Milpitas and the
union attempted to build housing for its black workers, the area selected was
promptly rezoned industrially to deter black residency. See Abrams, supra
note 103, at 516. Similarly, in 1948 former HUD Secretary Robert Weaver ob-
served that in St Louis, black residential areas were "hemmed in" both by re-
strictive covenants and by industry and commerce. WEAVER, supra note 54, at
246-47; see also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Lau-
rel, 456 A.2d 390, 462 (N.J. 1983) (Mt Laurel I) (describing the zoning of land
for low income housing in inaccessible and industrial zone); Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 730 (N.J.) (Mt
Laurel ) (documenting the overzoning of land for industrial use), appeal dis-
missed and cert denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
106. See AmERiCAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, THE TEXT OF A MODEL
ZONING ORDINANCE 3 (3d ed. 1966).
[lit is a rare ordinance indeed that does not commit greatli excessive
land areas to commercial or industrial use, thereby ensuring that the
land so classified will not be used for much of anything or that in the
spotty development that does result large sections of the community
will be permanently blighted.
Id.
107. Rabin, supra note 11, at 107. It matters little whether the primary ob-
jective served through the incompatible zoning of African-American residen-
tial communities was economic development or race-based displacement.
Professor Rabin observes that "[i]n either case, the pursuit of profit or the ex-
pression of prejudice, the interests and welfare of blacks have been equally ex-
pendable." Id,
108. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1365
(W.D.N.C. 1969); see also James McMillan, Social Science and the District
Court7 The Observations of a Journeyman Trial Judge, 39 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 161 & n.17 (1975).
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landmark exclusionary zoning litigation which the NAACP ini-
tiated, the township attempted to satisfy its court-imposed af-
firmative "fair share" low-income housing obligations, in part,
by designating thirteen acres for such housing in the midst of
an industrial zone. In the first Mt. Laurel decision, the New
Jersey Supreme Court found that the township significantly
overzoned for industrial use; while it had zoned nearly thirty
percent of its land industrially, amounting to over 4,100 acres,
only 100 acres were actually developed industrially in the dec-
ade.109 When examining the propriety of the township's effort
at compliance with the Mt. Laurel I mandate through the
designation of the thirteen-acre tract, the court stated:
It is owned by an industrial developer, is totally surrounded by indus-
trially zoned land, virtually isolated from residential uses, has no
present access to other parts of the community, no water or sewer
connections nearby, is in the path of a high speed railroad line and is
subject to possible flooding. It would be hard to find.., a less suita-
ble parcel for lower income or indeed any kind of housing.1 0
E. ZONING AND ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
With the emerging recognition of the problem of "environ-
mental racism,""' the relative powerlessness of African-Ameri-
109. Mt Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 730.
110. Mt Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 462.
111. The origin of the phrase "environmental racism" has been attributed
to a 1987 Report of the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Jus-
tice. See COMMIsSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RA-
CIAL AND SocIo-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES wrrT HAZARD-
OUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter ToXIc WASTES AND RACE]. This report,
self-styled as "the first national report to comprehensively document the pres-
ence of hazardous wastes in racial and ethnic communities," implored its read-
ers "committed to racial and environmental justice to challenge [this] insidious
form of racism'." Id. at ix-x. For a discussion of the United Church of Christ's
1987 Report, see Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism- Re-
viewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 163, 164 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai
eds., 1992); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 394, 395 (1991). See generally STEPHANIE POLLACK & JOANN
GROZUCZAK, REAGAN, TOxICS AND MINORITIES: A POLICY REPORT BY THE UR-
BAN ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE, INC. (1984) (attacking the Reagan administra-
tion's health and environmental policies for their disproportionate impact on
minorities and low income Americans); ALTERNATIVE POLICY INST. OF THE
CTR. FOR THIRD WORLD ORG., ToxiCS AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1986) (ex-
amining the extent of toxic problems in minority communities); Regina Austin
& Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots En-
vironmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, I KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69
(1991) (discussing emergence of minority grassroots groups to combat environ-
mental racism); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A.H. Robertson, Environmen-
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can communities is often a prominent factor in zoning and
siting decisions. As environmental sociologist Robert Bullard
observed, "toxic dumping and the siting of locally unwanted
land uses (LULUs) have followed the 'path of least resist-
ance.' "112 Because residents of white neighborhoods marshall
substantial resources to divert LULUs somewhere else, "these
LULUs usually end up in poor, powerless black communities
rather than in affluent suburbs."'113 This pattern persists "even
though the benefits attributable to industrial waste production
are directly related to affluence." 114 Professor Bullard suggests
that "public officials and private industry have in many cases
responded to the NIMBY [not-in my backyard] phenomenon,
using the place-in-blacks'-backyard (PIBBY) principle.""15
Zoning and other "protectionist" land use devices fail to protect
low-income communities of color from this pattern."
6
The recent report of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) Environmental Equity workgroup confirmed
many of Professor Bullard's observations. The EPA workgroup
found evidence that "minorities are more likely to live near a
commercial waste treatment facility or an uncontrolled hazard-
tal Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 153 (1991) (discussing environmental racism, specifically referring to sit-
ing of hazardous waste facilities).
112. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY 4 (1990).
113. Id at 5, 85-86. Mohai & Bryant note:
These communities tend to be where residents are unaware of the
policy decisions affecting them and are unorganized and lack re-
sources for taking political action .... Minority communities are at a
disadvantage not only in terms of availability of resources but also be-
cause of underrepresentation on governing bodies when location deci-
sions are made.
Mohai & Bryant, supra note 111, at 164; see also Godsil, supra note 111, at 402-
03 (attributing disproportionate burden of hazardous waste facilites on minor-
ity communities to relative lack of public opposition).
114. BULLARD, supra note 112, at 5.
115. Id,
116. Id. at 9-10, 85-86. A recent special investigation by the National Law
Journal suggests that communities of color have received less environmental
protection from the federal government as well. See Unequal Protection: The
Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1-12. The
National Law Journal investigation, which included analysis of every toxic
waste site in the 12-year history of the Superfund program and every environ-
mental lawsuit initiated by the federal government in the last seven years,
concluded that "[w]hite communities see faster action, better results and stif-
fer penalties than communities where blacks, Hispanics and other minorities
live." Id. at S1.
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ous waste site than the general population. ' 117 The work-
group's report referred to the United Church of Christ's 1987
study-1 8 which found that the proportion of minorities residing
in communities with either the largest commercial landfills or
the most commercial waste facilities was triple that of other
communities. 119 While suggesting that there are exceptions
where poor communities seek a waste site or industrial facility
to create jobs or increase the tax base, 2 0 the workgroup recog-
nized that "a result of the 'not in my backyard (NIMBY)' syn-
drome is that such facilities will tend to be located in
117. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIEs 15
(1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY]; see also 2 idc at 7-9, 18 (support-
ing document).
118. See supra note 111 (introducing and citing to the United Church of
Christ Report).
119. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 117, at 15. The workgroup also
noted the General Accounting Office's 1983 study that found that blacks com-
prised the majority in three of the four communities where offsite hazardous
waste landfills were located in eight southeastern states surveyed. Id at 14;
see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LAND-
FILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION wITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SUR-
ROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
120. The assertion that communities of color generally either seek or ap-
prove of the economic trade-offs purportedly associated with environmentally
undesirable uses is questionable. In a rare empirical study of the preferences
and attitudes of African-American residents of communities containing indus-
trial waste facilities, an "overwhelming majority (70 percent) of the residents
[of the five communities surveyed] saw the industrial facilities as more of a
'burden' than a 'benefit' to their communities." BULLARD, supra note 112, at
79-81, 95. Some of the residents surveyed also challenged the underlying as-
sumptions of economic benefit to the community. One resident suggested that
the tax base would not be markedly enhanced through the taxes generated
from an industrial facility since the facility would lower neighboring property
values and the corresponding taxes from those properties. Id at 94. Others
indicated that the industrial facilities often failed to deliver on their promise
of jobs. Whether this was due to the non-labor intensive nature of the facility
in question or a failure to hire local residents, this fact undermines the pur-
ported employment trade-off. See id- at 93.
Professor Bullard suggests, in any event, that the jobs versus environment
dilemma and the issue of monetary compensation for ongoing environmental
hazards are tantamount to "environmental blackmail," and raise moral ques-
tions about the propriety of paying the poor to assume risks deemed unaccept-
able to the privileged. I& at 91. Federal policy on the siting of low-income
housing has been expressly designed to avert such a Hobson's choice for low-
income housing residents. The HUD site selection regulations require that
new public or assisted housing be sited in neighborhoods which are both "free
from adverse environmental conditions" and within a reasonable travel time
and cost from "places of employment providing a range of jobs for lower-in-
come workers." See 24 C.F.R. §§ 941.202(e), (h), 880.206(e), (h) (1992).
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communities with the least ability to mount a protest."' 2 '
An example of this pattern is found in R.IS.E., Inc. v.
Kay, 22 where a bi-racial environmental community organiza-
tion in King and Queen County, Virginia challenged the siting
of a regional solid waste landfill in a predominantly African-
American community as part of a "pattern and practice of ra-
cial discrimination in landfill location and zoning."'' 23 Pursuant
to its plan for siting the contested landfill, the county planned
to rezone the proposed site from an agricultural and low-den-
sity rural designation to industrial use.2 4
In denying defendant's summary judgment motion on the
plaintiff's equal protection claims, the court found that "[t]he
proposed landfill will be located in a predominantly black area"
and that "[a]ll three of the already operating county-run land-
fills are similarly located in predominantly black areas."'2 5
The court also noted the comparative inability of the black
community to secure zoning protection26 It stated:
[Tihe plaintiffs provide evidence that white resistance to the opera-
tion of a private landfill in a predominantly white residential neigh-
borhood resulted in official denial of a proposed zoning variance
necessary for the industrial use of a site zoned for agricultural use
only. In contrast, the concerns of black residents about the effects of
the proposed landfill on property values in the adjacent neighbor-
hoods did not result in similar treatment. Rather, county officials ap-
proved a sudden change in zoning that transformed the site from one
appropriate for agricultural use only to one appropriate for industrial
use to accommodate the proposed landfill.
... The evidence provided by the plaintiffs of the disparate im-
pact of county landfill placement on black residents, the contrast be-
tween official responsiveness to white resistance to landfill
development and apparent nonresponsiveness to the concerns of black
residents, and departures from normal procedures in gaining approval
for the landfill suggests the decision to locate the landfill in a
predominantly black community may have been motivated by dis-
criminatory intent.127
121. ENVIRONMENTAL EQuITY, supra note 117, at 20-21.
122. 768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991).
123. I& at 1142.
124. 1& at 1142-43
125. I& at 1143.
126. Id. at 1143-44.
127. Id In a separate opinion on the merits of the case, the court reaf-
firmed its finding on the racially disparate impact of the county's landfill sit-
ing practices but ruled, nonetheless, that the plaintiff presented insufficient
evidence of discriminatory intent to support a finding of a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50
(E.D. Va. 1991). Central to the court's holding was its finding that the latest
site in the black community was environmentally more suitable for a landfill
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Similarly, in Larramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Author-
ity,128 African-American community residents challenged the
City of Chicago's selection of their neighborhood to bear the
brunt of the displacement and ongoing environmental intru-
sions stemming from the siting of a new baseball stadium for
the Chicago White Sox.12 9 In connection with its plan, the Illi-
nois Sports Facilities Authority displaced 425 African-American
households. Additionally, the Authority received an amend-
ment to the city's zoning ordinance for the neighborhood,
which waived "'virtually every limitation which applied to
every other development in the City', including limitations con-
cerning light, heat, noise, smoke, toxic discharge, noxious odors,
fire, and explosive materials."'130 The district court denied a
motion to dismiss the area residents' challenge, finding that the
plaintiffs properly had alleged a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, by having asserted that the sports authority and
the city could have sited the stadium in an adjacent white com-
munity with less disruption to that community.131
F. ZONING AND GENTRIFICATION
Zoning that significantly increases the cost of retaining
housing can be as disruptive to the residents of low-income
communities of color as zoning that degrades their environ-
ment. The eventual consequence of such zoning and planning
measures is the displacement of low-income residents through
the process of gentrification, 132 a process that has been labeled
than the previously proposed site in the white community. See id. at 1150.
Thus, the county's decision could be justified based on the "relative environ-
mental suitability of the sites" rather than on racial animus. Id; accord East
Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
706 F. Supp. 880, 884-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (finding no intentional discrimination
in selection of "adequate" landfill site despite discriminatory impact from sit-
ing decision), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990).
For a discussion of alternative legal theories for addressing this problem,
see infra at Part II.B-D. Among other approaches, the finding of disparate im-
pact alone could be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the Fair
Housing Act. See infra Part H.B. In addition, an approach focusing on a
broader pattern of historic zoning and planning discrimination-which might
explain how the African-American community became more vulnerable to or
"environmentally suitable" for landfills and other "LULUs" in the first
place-might yield greater evidence of intentional discrimination. See iifra
Part II.B-D.
128. 722 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
129. Id. at 445.
130. Id. at 445-46.
131. Id. at 450.
132. For definitions of the term "gentrification," see supra note 13.
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"suburbanization in reverse" or "reverse exclusionary zon-
ing."' 33 Gentrification has affected a significant and increasing
number of African-American families.'1  Although gentrifica-
tion-induced displacement usually exacts a heavy toll on all dis-
located families, African-American families priced out of their
own housing must confront the additional obstacles involved in
seeking affordable relocation housing in a scarce and discrimi-
natory private housing market.135 These obstacles are some-
times compounded by the efforts of the new residents or
"gentry" who, in the name of integration, obstruct the develop-
ment of new subsidized housing which could permit displaced
residents to resettle in their old neighborhoods. 36
133. See Harold A. McDougall, Gentrifcatio The Class Conflict over Ur-
ban Space Moves into the Courts, 10 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 180 (1982); cf.
supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing exclusionary zoning).
134. See Richard T. LeGates & Chester Hartman, Displacement, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 207, 234-35 (1981) [hereinafter LeGates & Hartman, Dis-
placement]; Richard T. LeGates & Chester Hartman, Gentr fzcation-Caused
Displacement, 14 URB. LAw. 31, 40-42 (1982); Marcuse, supra note 13, at 195,
225-27. See generally McGee, supra note 13 (describing gentrification and re-
spose of effected African-Americans); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement
and Urban Reinvestment. A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333,
335 nn.8-9 (1984) (discussing government studies on reinvestment displace-
ment and its effects on "socially vulnerable populations"); James D. Besser,
'Gentrijying' the Ghetto, THE PRoGRESsIVE, Jan. 1979, at 30 (analyzing gentrifi-
cation and its impact on minorities); Travis J. Dempsey, How Whites are Tak-
ing Back Black Neighborhoods, EBONY, Sept. 1978, at 72 (same).
135. McGee, supra note 13, at 39; Peter Marcuse et al., Off-Site Displace-
ment: How the Changing Economic Tide of a Neighborhood Can Drown Out
the Poor, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1353, 1368 (1989); see Garrett v. City of
Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 21 (E.D. Mich. 1971), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir.
1974); cf Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1969) (recog-
nizing the greater relocation burden on minority displacees); Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 & n.18 (2d Cir. 1968) (same). For
discussion of the persistence of pervasive discrimination against African-Amer-
icans in the private housing market, see supra note 78 and authorities cited
therein. For discussion of the overrepresentation of African-Americans among
the homeless and among those living in substandard, overcrowded or unafford-
able housing, see EDWARD B. LAZERE & PAUL A. LEONARD, CENTER ON
BUDGET AND PoLIcY PRIoREs, THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR: A
SPECIAL REPORT ON HISPANICS AND BLACKS (1989); Peter H. Rossi, Minorities
and Homelessness, in DIVIDED OPPORTUNITIES: MINORITIES, POVERTY, AND So-
CIAL POLICY 87, 93-95 (Gary D. Sandefur & Marta Tienda eds., 1988); see also
NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding "housing emer-
gency" for low-income black families in Boston).
136. McDougall, supra note 133, at 178-80; Alan M. White, Note, Gentrif-
cation, Tipping and the National Housing Policy, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 255, 262 & n.52 (1982-83); see, e.g., Alschuler v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982); Business Ass'n of Univeristy
City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12
(1st Cir. 1980); cf Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1010-11 (W.D. Mo. 1990)
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Zoning and planning measures that stimulate gentrification
also have been rationalized in the name of community develop-
ment.137 Frequently the affected communities, having been
redlined for years, possess a dire need for an increased tax base,
improved services, and jobs. 138 The benefits of these govern-
ment-induced private revitalization and economic development
efforts often have not accrued to the original residents of the
affected communities.139 As a result, an increasing number of
low-income communities of color have challenged these meas-
ures, arguing that government has a duty to improve the neigh-
borhoods without removing their residents.140
(challenging demolition of vacant federal public housing units on Fair Housing
Act grounds due to adverse impact on minorities on the housing waiting list
who were disproportionately homeless and "inadequately housed"); Settlement
in Newark Public Housing Demolition Case, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending
[Bulletin], Dec. 1, 1989, % 6.14 (reporting settlement reached in challenge to
planned destruction of public housing units without replacements and without
"intention or strategy to provide the same number of low income public hous-
ing units"). In reality, gentrifying neighborhoods rarely experience anything
more than a momentary increase in residential integration since black neigh-
borhood residents are disproportionately priced out over time. See LeGates &
Hartman, Displacement, supra note 134, at 232-34; James G. Durham & Dean
E. Sheldon, III, Mitigating the Effects of Private Revitalization On Housing
For the Poor, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 17 (1986); White, supra, at 262. The irony of
the newcomers' efforts to preclude new low-income housing, in the name of
integration, is that, if successful, these efforts are more likely to prevent the
reintegration of neighborhoods and result in white upper middle-class homo-
geneity. McDougall, supra note 133, at 180. In recognition of the conse-
quences of gentrification, HUD has authorized the placement of new low-
income housing in "revitalizing" neighborhoods notwithstanding the regula-
tory mandate to site assisted housing outside of areas of minority concentra-
tion. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 636 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting
that "the creation of the Revitalizing Area promotes integration by encourag-
ing the development of assisted housing before land values and rents become
prohibitively expensive and before low-income individuals are displaced by
physical redevelopment.").
137. See Marcuse, supra note 14, at 196.
138. See supra note 57 (describing redlining); Donald C. Bryant, Jr. &
Henry W. McGee, GentrfWation and the Law: Combatting Urban Displace-
ment, 25 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 43, 66-68 (1983).
139. Bryant & McGee, supra note 138, at 68; see McGee, supra note 13, at
44 (quoting a description of the effects of gentrification on the original resi-
dents of affected communities from R. Sully, Gentrification 6 (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript)).
140. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 421, 430 (1st Cir. 1983);
Pleune v. Pierce, 697 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). An organizer of one such
challenge to a gentrification-inducing zoning and planning measure stated: "It
is with peaceful, but powerful hearts that we move into the next phase of
seeking to preserve our Black heritage land in the City of Cocoa.... Our re-
quest to the City has been clear and consistent: Improve, not remove; rebuild,
not destroy." John A. Nagy, Cocoa Neighbors File Suit over City's Plan to
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In Houston v. City of Cocoa,14 1 low-income residents of an
African-American community in Cocoa, Florida challenged a
rezoning ordinance that created market incentives for the de-
velopment of luxury condominiums and commercial complexes
in their neighborhood.- 42 The rezoning ordinance was the lat-
est measure in a fifty-year pattern of discriminatory zoning and
land use decisions that plaintiffs alleged had the "purpose and
effect of undermining the Neighborhood residents' quality of
life, encouraging the deterioration of their homes and tenancies
and causing their displacement."' 143 This pattern of discrimina-
tory zoning included nearly fifty years of incompatible low-
grade commercial zoning that introduced auto body shops, junk
yards, and other noxious and blighting uses into the area.144
Convert Area, FLA. TODAY, Feb. 2, 1989, at 1B (statement of Roni Houston Mc-
Neil at press conference announcing the filing of Houston v. City of Cocoa).
For discussion of the ways in which revitalization can be accomplished without
producing significant displacement, see Joseph Giovanini, A Neighborhood Is
Renewed While Its Residents Stay Put, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1988, at C5. See
generally Durham & Sheldon, supra note 136; Marcuse, supra note 14; Peter
J. MacDonald, Note, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating
Condominium Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U. L.
REV. 955 (1983).
141. 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 15,625 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989)
(order denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
142. The plaintiffs' class action complaint alleged that the rezoning ordi-
nance created a new high density residential and core commercial district
within the community. Complaint 57, 59, City of Cocoa (No. 89-82-CIV-
ORL-19). The new zoning rewarded developers who built in these districts
through "performance standard bonuses" (PSBs) and "transferable develop-
ment rights" ("TDRs"). Id. 57. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that:
The PSBs reward developers for building larger units, building on
larger lots or building with exceptional urban design features. The
PSBs authorize such developers to build with greater density than is
otherwise permitted. The TDRs further reward such developers by
permitting them to transfer their development rights acquired in the
Neighborhood to the Central Business District ("CBD") and build
with greater square footage there than is otherwise permitted. The
CBD is located in a particularly valuable area of town and is also the
area in which costly riverfront development has occurred and is pro-
posed in the Redevelopment Plan.
58. The intended and foreseeable effect of the PSBs and TDRs is
to displace the Plaintiffs by promoting the aggregation of separate
parcels and the construction of larger and costlier units in the
Neighborhood.
Id. 57-58.
143. Id. 2. Originally the virtually all-black community had been main-
tained as a separate community through the use of an explicit racial zoning
ordinance enacted in 1938. See Cocoa, Fla., Ordinance 1210 (Dec. 13, 1938)
("An Ordinance Dividing the City of Cocoa into Two Zones to be Called the
White Zone and Colored Zone .. ").
144. Complaint 3, City of Cocoa (No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19).
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The pattern also included eight years of redlining from govern-
ment home improvement funds, and a plan to acquire and clear
the neighborhood through the city's powers of redevelopment
and eminent domain.145 Ironically, the city's clearance plan
was designed to eliminate blight in the area, and it specifically
had cited the incompatible zoning as "one cause in adding to
the blighting influence of the neighborhood."' 46
Plaintiffs asserted that the city, after having blighted the
neighborhood, sought to redevelop it "not for the benefit of its
traditional black residents, but for the benefit of new, higher
income and foreseeably white residents and business own-
ers."'147 The rezoning incentives and related redevelopment ac-
tivities were designed to induce private developers to
accomplish indirectly what the city had attempted to do di-
rectly through acquisition and clearance.148
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss,
upholding the plaintiffs' standing to challenge the city's con-
duct.149 The court recognized that the challenged conduct was
part of a long-term, ongoing pattern of discriminatory zoning
and land use planning, and that the latest measures presented a
"real and immediate" threat of injury to the plaintiffs by subtle
displacement. 150
In a similar challenge, 16th Census Tract Crisis Committee
v. City of Alexandria,l-5 residents of a low-income African-
American community in Alexandria, Virginia filed an adminis-
trative complaint with HUD contesting an ordinance that desig-
nated their community a historic district. The residents feared
that designation would cause their eventual displacement by
gentrification due to the costs of repair and improvements the
145. 1d. 13.
146. COCOA REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, COCOA REDEVELOPMENT PLAN SUP-
PLEMENT 19 (1981).
147. Complaint % 4, City of Cocoa (No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19).
148. Displacement by private development would relieve the city not only
of the costs associated with acquisition and clearance but also those associated
with relocation obligations. See, e.g., Durham & Sheldon, supra note 136, at 2;
MacDonald, supra note 140, at 956.
149. Houston v. City of Cocoa, 2 Fair-Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 15,625,
at 16,208-09 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989).
150. Id at 16,208. For further discussion of the bases of plaintiffs' substan-
tive claims and the holding of the district court, see infra notes 236-40 and ac-
companying text.
151. For a description of the challenge, see Office of Fair Hous. & Equal
Opportunity, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Final Investigative Report in
16th Census Tract Crisis Committee v. City of Alexandria 2-3 (Sept. 19, 1986)
[hereinafter Crisis Committee] (on file with author).
[Vol. 77:739
DISCRIMINATORY ZONING
ordinance required and increased tax assessments resulting
from the anticipated rise in property values.' 52
HUD's Office of Fair Housing & Equal Opportunity deter-
mined in its final investigative report that the historic designa-
tion was "specifically intended to displace low and moderate
income Blacks, along with others from the... [neighborhood],
in order to upgrade properties there, to preserve a period qual-
ity of some architecture there, and to promote the rise of prop-
erty values and attraction of new residents.' 153 The report
noted that the residents of this new, historic district "necessar-
ily must include a smaller proportion of minorities because of
the increased financial outlay necessary . . . and [because]
Blacks have by far a lower average income in Alexandria than
the white population."'154
The HUD report also found that the city had knowledge of
the anticipated adverse impact of its ordinance on the ability of
low-income African-American families to retain housing in the
community, and that it had failed to adequately mitigate that
impact.' 55 HUD concluded that the city's conduct discriminated
against African-American community residents in violation of
the Fair Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.156
G. ZONING AND HISPANIC COMMUNITIES
The historic and continuing practices of officially sanc-
152. Idi
153. I& at 85.
154. Id (citations to documents omitted).
155. Id- at 89. The city's goals of "increasing property values and protect-
ing a few buildings" through the new district were determined "insufficient in
themselves (and capable in large part of being accomplished by less drastic
means) to outweigh the negative impact on the protected class." Id. at 88-89.
156. Id- at 90. In language which, under a Reagan administration commit-
ted to relatively unrestrained entrepreneurialism, revealed uncharacteristic
sensitivity to the potentially negative impacts on low-income African-Ameri-
can communities from encroaching private market development, the report
cautioned that "[w]e must never lose sight of this fact ... that the... ordi-
nance, by definition, is intended to apply to a community which is 90% Black
and to a very great degree composed of low and moderate income families
with children." Id. at 4. It continued:
In short, the complainant class is a struggling group of low- or
moderate-income minority persons, surrounded by affluence, endeav-
oring to maintain their traditional neighborhoods and many owner-oc-
cupied homes .... They ... give every appearance of representing a
distinctive minority culture and tradition in Alexandria, situated in a
developmentally desirable section of the City, which is highly vulner-
able to the depradations of an encroaching affluent society.
I& at 16.
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tioned zoning and land use discrimination are perhaps most
pervasive and well-documented as they pertain to African-
American communities.15 7 African-Americans have been sub-
jected to the widest variety of de jure discriminatory prac-
tices,158 and currently experience the greatest degree of
residential segregation.159 Because physical separation from
the dominant majority group enhances the potential for une-
157. Other minority groups such as Native-Americans have been subjected
to similar discrimination. Although this country's ignominious history of land
appropriation and land use discrimination against Native-Americans is beyond
the scope of this Article, for references to this history, see generally ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT. THE
DIscoURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (examining the role of legal thought in the
conquest of the American Indians), and Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law:
An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34
KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986) (looking at historical and contemporary experience of
Native-Americans). For discussion of current issues involving the nature and
quality of the residential environment for Native-Americans, see Rossi, supra
note 135, at 93-95 (discussing the overrepresentation of Native-Americans
among the homeless); Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control
of the Reservation Environment. Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation and the
Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581 (1989); C. Matthew Snipp &
Alan L. Sorkin, American Indian Housing: An Overview of Conditions and
Public Policy, in RACE, ETHNICrrY AND MINORITY HOUSING IN THE UNITED
STATES 147 (Jamshid A. Momeni ed., 1986).
158. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390-95
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the
"legacy of discrimination" against African-Americans). The Supreme Court
has also recognized de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the
Southwest. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954) (noting that
children of Mexican descent had been "required to attend a segregated school
.... At least one restaurant in town prominently displayed a sign announcing
'No Mexicans Served.' On the courthouse grounds at the time of the hearing,
there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored
Men' and 'Hombres Aqui ('Men Here')."); see also White v. Register, 412 U.S.
766, 768 (1973) (upholding lower court finding that "Mexican-Americans in
Texas, had long suffered from, and continu[ ] to suffer from, the results and
effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of education,
employment, economics, health, politics, and others."), vacated as moot, 422
U.S. 935 (1975); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 547, 551-52 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that 87% of AFDC recipients are blacks or Chicanos and
that "Chicanos in Texas fare even more poorly than the blacks.").
159. See Joe T. Darden, Accessibility to Housing: Differential Residential
Segregation For Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, and Asians, in RACE,
ETHNICITY AND MINORITY HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 157, at
107, 124 (finding that blacks are more segregated and less suburban than his-
panics, Asians, or Native-Americans); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton,
Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segrega-
tion Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1989) (examining segrega-
tion levels of blacks and hispanics and concluding that "blacks occupy a unique
and distinctly disadvantaged position in the U.S. urban environment."); Mar-
garet L. Udansky, USA at Home: Streets Still Isolate Races, USA TODAY, Nov.
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qual treatment, inequitable zoning and land use practices have
the greatest impact on African-Americans. 160
Nevertheless, other communities of color-in particular,
Puerto Rican and Mexican-American communities [hereinafter
hispanics16 1]-have similarly experienced substantial govern-
11, 1991, at 1A (analyzing 1990 census data revealing blacks to be more segre-
gated than either hispanics or Asians).
160. Cf Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and
the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 776 (1986) (indicating that in prac-
tice "'green follows white' (that is, in a society where whites remain the ma-
jority, the presence of whites in an institution protects that institution against
racially unequal distribution of resources")); James S. Liebman, Implementing
Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, Litiga-
tively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 362 (1990) (arguing
that "desegregation situates formerly discriminating citizens so that they can-
not harm their previous victims without harming themselves .... ).
161. For a discussion of the amibiguity and deficiency of the term "his-
panic," see Alex M. Saragoza et al., History and Public Policy: Title VII and
the Use of the Hispanic Classifwation, 5 LA RAZA L.J. (1992); David Gonzalez,
What's the Problem with Hispanic? Just Ask a Latino, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1992, at E6. The other large Hispanic-American ethnic group, Cuban-Ameri-
cans, is comprised of relatively recent immigrants; most were uprooted by the
Cuban revolution and arrived in the United States in the 1960s. Louie A.
Woolbright & David J. Hartman, The New Segregation: Asians and Hispanics,
in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 78, at 138, 151-53. Because these refu-
gees were primarily middle class and white and received the benefits of gov-
ernment programs designed to aid in their assimilation, they have experienced
less residential segregation and are more suburban than either Puerto Ricans
or Mexican-Americans. Id. at 143-44, 151-52; see also CENTER ON BUDGET AND
PoLicY PmoRrIES, SHORTCHANGED: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HISPANIC
POVERTY, INcoME AND EMPLOYMENT 21 (1988) (finding that the typical Cuban
family had an income over twice as high as the typical Puerto Rican family
and nearly a third higher than the typical Mexican-American family). This
situation may change since more recent Cuban immigrants, including many
who arrived from the Mariel boat lift of the late 1970s, tend to come from
lower-income backgrounds and have African ancestry. Woolbright & Hart-
man, supra, at 152. For a discussion of the relationship of income to residen-
tial mobility see supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text, and also see infra
notes 166-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the role of race or
skin color see infra note 165.
Asian-Americans also experience comparatively little residential segrega-
tion relative to other racial minority groups. Woolbright & Hartman, supra, at
143; Darden, supra note 159, at 122-23; Maria Goodavage, Asians: Not All Fit
Successful Stereotype, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1991, at 6A. Asian residential as-
similation has occurred notwithstanding a discriminatory land use history
which has included explicit racial zoning laws directed against Chinese-Ameri-
cans and the internment of Japanese-Americans. See, e.g., note 16 and accom-
panying text (discussing San Francisco's 1890 anti-Chinese ordinance);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of Jap-
anese-Americans). Asian-Americans' success in achieving a wider and supe-
rior range of housing opportunities has been attributed to their greater
income, wealth, and educational levels than all other racial minority groups.
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mental discrimination. Although there are no accounts of ex-
plicit racial zoning ordinances directed against these groups,
racial covenants were employed extensively against hispanics in
the West and Southwest.162 Public housing site and tenant se-
lection16 3 and urban renewal policy have also served to confine
hispanics to segregated and inferior housing.'6
Residential opportunities for hispanics have also been con-
stricted by racial discrimination in the private housing market.
Private market studies reveal that hispanics, particularly those
who are dark-skinned, suffer substantial private housing dis-
crimination. 65 Because of their extreme poverty,166 hispanics,
Darden, supra note 159, at 122-23; see also Julia L. Hansen, Housing Problems
of Asian Americans, in RACE, ETnmcrrY AND miNoRITY HOUSING IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 157, at 177, 186 (revealing that U.S. census data
shows all Asian ethnic groups except the Vietnamese have median incomes,
education levels, and employment in managerial or professional occupations in
excess of whites). Nevertheless, some Asian-American communities, which
have remained low-income in character, have confronted some of the incom-
patible zoning and planning practices discussed herein. See, e.g., Asian-Ameri-
cans For Equality v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1988) (challenge to
government-assisted gentrification in New York's Chinatown); Chinese Staff
& Worker's Ass'n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986) (same).
162. See ABRAMS, supra note 78, at 52; see also Clifton v. Puente, 218
S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (challenging restrictive covenant prohibiting
ownership or usage of property by persons of Mexican descent); Mathews v.
Andrade, 198 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (same).
163. See Flournoy & Rodrigue, supra note 89 (finding that both blacks and
hispanics in 47 cities live in public housing projects separate from and inferior
in services, location, condition and amenities to white-occupied projects);
Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Auth. of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1140-
42 (W.D. Tex. 1971) ("[Flrom 1938 to 1967, it was the official policy.., to seg-
regate Anglos, Negroes and Mexican-Americans into different public housing
projects.").
164. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 925
(2d Cir. 1968) (finding that "[slome of the displaced... Puerto Rican families
have been compelled to move into overcrowded housing, some into housing in
excess of their financial means, and some into housing outside of the City");
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 233 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (several groups,
including a Mexican-American citizens group, challenged a federal-aid high-
way project because of displacement and inadequate relocation), qff'd, 488
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
165. See JON HAKKEN, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHICANOS IN THE DALLAS
RENTAL HOUSING MARYET: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXTENSION OF THE HOUSING
MARK= PRACTICES SURVEY (1979) (finding that dark-skinned Mexican-Amer-
icans faced a far higher probability of experiencing at least one incident of dis-
crimination in a typical housing search than light-skinned Mexican-
Americans); Woolbright & Hartman, supra note 161, at 150-51 (noting that Pu-
erto Ricans' African ancestry explains in part their greater degree of residen-
tial segregation than all other hispanic groups); Margaret L. Udansky,
Hispanics: Caught in the Middle, Puerto Ricans are Facing the Most Isolation,
USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1991, at 6A; cf. Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp.
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like African-Americans, are particularly vulnerable to exclu-
sionary zoning and similar measures that limit residential op-
portunities by increasing the cost of housing.167
Governments have also engaged in conduct that has dimin-
ished the quality of the residential environment within hispanic
communities. This conduct includes the failure to provide ade-
quate basic municipal services, 168 the relocation or non-location
301, 308 (W.D. Mich.) ("[B]ecause of economic, social and cultural disadvan-
tages of Mexican-Americans in the Lansing area, as well as their darker com-
plexion, they also are victims of racial discrimination within the meaning of
the thirteenth amendment."), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 397
U.S. 980 (1969); ABRAMS, supra note 78, at 73 (1955) (finding that dark skinned
Mexicans face similar "exclusions and discriminations" as blacks, and that Pu-
erto Ricans "rated black by mainland standards" face housing discrimination).
166. 1990 U.S. census data reveals that 40.6% of Puerto Ricans and 28.1% of
Mexican-Americans live below the poverty level, as compared with 31.9% of
African-Americans and only 10.7% of whites. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL-
icy PRIORITIES, 1990 PovERTY TABLES 3, 25 (1992). For an analysis of the de-
clining economic status of Puerto Ricans relative to other hispanics, see Marta
Tienda, Puerto Ricans and the Underclass Debate, 501 ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. Scis. 105, 105-19 (1989).
167. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (challenging zoning ordi-
nance because of their exclusionary impact on low-income African-Americans
and Puerto Ricans); Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250
(9th Cir. 1974) (challenging zoning ordinance which increased the cost of hous-
ing and precluded residency by low-income Mexican-Americans); Southern Al-
ameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1970) (challenging city council's failure to rezone tract to permit development
of housing affordable to Mexican-Americans); see also CHARLES L. COTRELL,
MUNICIPAL SERVICES EQUALIZATION IN SAN ANTONIO, TExAS: EXPLORATIONS
IN 'CHINATOWN' 7-9 (The Southwest Urban Studies Series Vol. 2, George A.
Benz ed., 1976) (suggesting that after the invalidation of racial covenants, the
residential containment of Mexican-Americans in San Antonio was accom-
plished, in part, through minimum cost requirements in deeds).
168. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643, 652-53 (1966) (suggesting
that ban on English literacy voting requirements for persons educated in Pu-
erto Rico in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 "may be viewed as a measure to
secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscrimina-
tory treatment... in ... the provision or administration of governmental serv-
ices, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement"); Peter A.
Lupsha & William J. Siembieda, The Poverty of Public Services in the Land of
Plenty, in THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT CITIES 169, 183 (David C. Perry & Alfred
J. Watkins eds., 1977) (discussing fact that railroad tracks or "Las Trackas," as
South Texas Chicanos refer to them, created "color, class, and ethnic separa-
tion" as well as "the line for the disparate provision of public services"); see
also Jimenez v. Hidalgo County Water Dist. No. 2, 68 F.R.D. 668 (S.D. Tex.
1975) (challenging the exclusion of Mexican-American owned land from a
Texas water district and resulting denial of water, sewage, and drainage serv-
ices), aff'd mem., 424 U.S. 950 (1976). For an analysis of the litigation in
Jimenez, see Peter H. Weiner, Water, Water Everywhere: Power lows in the
Lower Rio Grande Valley, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 743 (1977).
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of important public institutions, 69 and incompatible zoning.
For example, in his study of municipal services in San Antonio,
Texas, political scientist Charles L. Cotrell documented the dis-
parate provision of protective zoning to San Antonio's Mexican-
American neighborhoods. After identifying zoning policy as
"those almost invisible decisions which determine so much of
the residential quality of life in the city,"'170 Professor Cotrell
explained his findings:
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that residential integrity-
residential areas which are basically intact and free from various cate-
gories of commercial zoning-are basically desirable environments.
Further, on requests for changes from residential to commercial zon-
ing, it is assumed that the Zoning Commission would adopt a decision-
making pattern which either affirmed (protected) neighborhood in-
tegrity (by denying requests for changes from residential to commer-
cial categories) or did not protect neighborhood integrity (by
affirming high percentages of requests from residential to commercial
categories).... The measured effect of these decisions seems to be
clear: the decisions of the Anglo-dominated Zoning Commission pro-
tect neighborhood integrity by denying commercial encroachment on
the Northside at a consistently higher rate than in the barrios. Ad-
ministrative domination thus has the effect of reinforcing through
zoning decisions the physical environment of the barrio.1
7 1
Finally, hispanic communities have also been subjected to the
two modern-day land use threats discussed herein: the dispa-
rate siting of environmentally degrading uses' 72 and govern-
169. See, e.g., United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex.
1980) (challenging the relocation of a public hospital's maternity and newborn
nursery units from Mexican-American inner-city neighborhood to predomi-
nantly "anglo" suburban community in San Antonio); St. Luke's Community
Coalition v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Medical Ctr., Administrative Complaint Filed
with United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Apr. 3, 1991) (challeng-
ing the relocation of government subsidized obstetric, neonatal, and pediatric
ward from mostly Puerto Rican section of southwest Harlem to midtown
Manhattan).
170. COTRELL, note 167, at 22.
171. Id. at 23-24; see also Rabin, supra note 11, at 118 (observing incompati-
ble zoning ana commercial encroachment in El Paso's Mexican-American com-
munity); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301, 304 (W.D. Mich.) (finding
that both blacks and Mexican-Americans have been displaced by industrial ex-
pansion in Lansing), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.), cerl denied, 397 U.S. 980
(1969).
172. See TOXIC WAsTES AND RACE, supra note 111, at 20-21 (finding a com-
parable pattern of disproportionate siting of uncontrolled toxic waste facilities
in hispanic and black communities); see, e.g., El Pueblo Para El Aire Y Agua
Limpio v. County of Kings, No. 366045 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 30,
1991) (writ of mandate granted on state environmental grounds, setting aside
conditional use permit to operate a toxic waste facility in an hispanic commu-
nity), further proceedings, (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. June 22, 1992) (denying
motion for new trial). For a discussion of the litigation in El Pueblo, see Susan
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ment-induced gentrification1 73
II THE RIGHT TO PROTECTIVE ZONING
A. THE PREMATURE DEMISE OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES
EQUALIZATION LITIGATION
As discussed in Part I, appropriate zoning protection is a
critically important government service in determining the
quality of a community's residential environment. The dispa-
rate denial of zoning protection, as with the denial of other im-
portant government services and benefits, implicates the
protections of anti-discrimination and due process law.
The Fifth Circuit's decisions in Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw1 74 represent the high-water mark in judicial efforts to se-
cure equality in the provision of municipal services for commu-
nities of color. In Hawkins, black residents of a Mississippi
Delta town characterized by virtual one hundred percent resi-
dential segregation 75 challenged extreme disparities in the pro-
vision of basic municipal services. Blacks occupied nearly
ninety-eight percent of the homes that fronted on unpaved
streets and ninety-seven percent of the homes lacking sanitary
sewers.' 76 The black community was similarly deprived of sur-
face water drainage, street lighting, water mains, and fire
hydrants. 77
Accepting the undisputed statistical evidence of disparities
in services, the district court nonetheless ruled against the
plaintiffs. 78 The court did not view these dramatic disparities
Dianne Rice, Waste Incinerator's Location Amounts to 'Environmental Ra-
cism', Suit Says, SAN FRAN. DAILY J., Feb. 7, 1991, at 1.
173. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 421, 430 (1st Cir. 1983)
(upholding standing of low-income blacks and hispanics to challenge govern-
ment-induced gentrification); Pleune v. Pierce, 697 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y.
1988), further proceedings, 765 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting summary
judgment to plaintiffs on their Title VII claim and nullifying HUD approval of
a development project); Brown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1119
(D.D.C. 1987) (granting preliminary injunction against eviction of low-income
hispanic and black tenants who were unable to pay increased rents caused by
government-subsidized apartment renovations), stay granted in part, 691 F.
Supp. 1459 (D.D.C. 1987).
174. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on reh'g per curiam, 461 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
175. The town of Shaw consisted of 2500 people of whom 1500 were black;
97% of the black residents lived in neighborhoods in which no whites resided.
Id. at 1288.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1289-91.
178. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd,
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as the result of intentional discrimination based on race or pov-
erty,179 but rather as the product of a "policy of slowly provid-
ing basic municipal services to the town's inhabitants," based on
"general usage, traffic needs, adequate rights of way and other
objective criteria," or physical impediments to the provision of
equal services.' 8 0 Accordingly, the district court concluded that
the city's service delivery practices satisfied the rational basis
standard of equal protection scrutiny. 81
On appeal, Judge Tuttle's opinion for the panel's majority
evinced immediate recognition of the nature and character of
underserved communities such as plaintiffs' neighborhood. In
his opening paragraph, Judge Tuttle referred to the phrase "on
the other side of the tracks," noting that it "conjures up an area
characterized by poor housing, overcrowded conditions and, in
short, overall deterioration.' 81 2 He concluded that "[w]hile
there may be many reasons why such areas exist in nearly all
of our cities, one reason that cannot be accepted is the discrimi-
natory provision of municipal services based on race.' 8l 3
Although he accepted the lower court's factual finding that
the gross disparities in services did not result from purposeful
discrimination, Judge Tuttle provided a sweeping rejection of
the district court's standard for evaluating those disparities. He
reasoned that discriminatory intent or motive did not have to
be directly proven, concluding that "we now firmly recognize
that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disas-
trous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme."'1 4 The plaintiffs' demonstra-
437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on reh'g per curiam, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc). While not a part of the plaintiffs' allegations, the district
court observed that the absence of zoning protection exacerbated the neigh-
borhoods' squalid housing conditions. Id at 1169.
179. The plaintiffs abandoned their claim of poverty or wealth discrimina-
tion on appeal. See Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1287 n.1. For a discussion of ap-
proaches addressing service disparities predicated on wealth discrimination
and notions of "minimal adequacy" as opposed to equality, see DIMOND, supra
note 91, at 147-82; Martin A. Schwartz, Comment, Municipal Services Litiga-
tion After Rodriguez, 40 BROOK. L. REv. 93, 97-100 (1973); cf Kadrmas v. Dick-
inson Public Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 461 n.1 (1988) (Marshall J., dissenting)
(observing that the question of whether denial of a "minimally adequate edu-
cation. . . would violate fundamental constitutional right" remains open).
180. Hawkins, 303 F. Supp. at 1168-69.
181. Id at 1169.
182. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1287.
183. Id
184. Id. at 1292 (quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395
F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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tion of the discriminatory effects of the town's municipal serv-
ices practices thus established a prima facie violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.185 After determining that "no com-
pelling state interests [could] possibly justify the discriminatory
results of Shaw's administration of municipal services,' 18 6
Judge Tuttle concluded that the town violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 8 7
On en banc rehearing, the full court reaffirmed the panel's
decision.l 8 In its per curiam opinion, the majority reempha-
sized that it is not necessary to prove intentional discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause. 8 9 Judge Wisdom specially
concurred, hailing the en banc court's decision as recognition of
"the right of every citizen regardless of race to equal municipal
services."19o
Judge Wisdom's sweeping proclamation created a new, but
short-lived, right. Four years after Hawkins, in Washington v.
Davis,19' the Supreme Court definitively and unambiguously
established a discriminatory intent requirement under the
Equal Protection Clause. Referring to the courts of appeals
that had found "substantially disproportionate racial impact"
sufficient to establish an equal protection violation, the major-
ity stated that "with all due respect, to the extent that those
cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of discrimina-
tory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal pro-
tection violation, we are in disagreement."' 92  Hawkins was
among the decisions the Court expressly disapproved.193
Since Washington v. Davis, race-based equalization litiga-
tion has been declared dead, or at least gravely wounded, with
185. Id. at 1288.
186. Id. at 1292.
187. Id In his concurring opinion, Judge Bell found the town's non-racial
explanations for the service disparities inadequate; he would have reversed the
lower court on the narrower ground that the finding of non-purposeful dis-
crimination was "clearly erroneous." Id. at 1293-94 (Bell, J., concurring).
188. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(en banc).
189. Id. at 1172-73.
190. I& at 1175 (Wisdom, J., concurring). Judges Roney and Clark au-
thored dissenting opinions excoriating the en banc majority for enunciating a
constitutional standard which authorized the usurpation of local city planning
decisions by substituting "one non-compelling list of priorities for another."
Id at 1180 (Roney, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1185-86 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(hypothesizing instance of "priority substitution").
191. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
192. Id. at 244-45.
193. Id. at 244 n.12.
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the suggestion that affected communities seek redress in the
political arena 94 or through resort to the common law.195 In-
deed, even prior to Davis, at least one commentator opined that
the Hawkins decision had provided a greater service to the
community of academics than to communities of color. 96
While the difficulties inherent in systemic race discrimination
litigation of any form in the 1990s cannot be overstated,197 there
is reason to believe that the reported death of equalization liti-
gation has been somewhat exaggerated.19 s
B. THE FAiR HOUSING ACT
Recent amendments and judicial interpretations of Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly referred to as
194. See Ralph A. Rossum, The Rise and Fall of Equalization Litigation, 7
CURRENT MUN. PROB. 58, 72 (1980) (arguing that the "demise of equalization
litigation" places responsibility for redress of service inequities with elected of-
ficials and government agencieis); cf Godsil, supra note 111, at 420-25 (analyz-
ing environmental racism as a municipal services disparity issue and
suggesting that judicial remedies will continue to be insufficient unless Con-
gress enacts a law containing a "disparate impact" standard).
195. See CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF
THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOvERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 15-20 (1986).
196. Clark Waddoups, Comment, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw-Equal Protec-
tion and Municipal Services: A Small Leap For Minorities But A Giant Leap
For The Commentators, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 397. For validation of the first part
of this proposition, see Martin A. Schwartz, Comment, Municipal Services Lit-
igation After Rodriguez, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 93, 94 & n.6 (1973) (collecting arti-
cles and observing that there are many on the subject).
197. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363
(1992) (discussing why legal formalism has provided barriers to racial justice
litigation and challenging the principle of racial equality); Calmore, supra note
15, at 225-35 (examining the link between racism and classism, and how tradi-
tional legal approaches fail to address the needs of the black poor).
198. The emerging recognition of the need to develop approaches for secur-
ing locational justice for persons of color not predicated solely on facilitating
access to white communities may revitalize interest in community improve-
ment advocacy. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 69, §§ 8.10, 8.13; Calmore, supra
note 7, at 104-09; Calmore, supra note 15, at 237-244; John 0. Calmore, Fair
Housing vs. Fair Housing: The Problem with Providing Increased Housing
Opportunities Through Spatial Deconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7
(1980); Ankur J. Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests:
An Anti-Subjugation Theory for Equality in Housing, 22 URB. L. 369 (1990);
McGee, supra note 13, at 39-44; Ankur J. Goel et al., Comment, Black Neigh-
borhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowermen Local Control and the
Implications of Being Darker than Brown, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415
(1988); Michael R. Tein, Comment, The Devaluation of Nonwhite Community
in Remedies For Subsidized Housing Discrimination, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1463
(1992).
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the Fair Housing Act, 99 provide a standard of liability for ad-
dressing municipal services disparities comparable to that enun-
ciated in Hawkins. Enacted within a month after the release of
the Kerner Commission Report2° ° and the murder of Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, the Fair Housing Act declared that the United
States must "provide within constitutional limitations for Fair
Housing throughout the United States."'20
While saying little about the Act's substantive contours,
the Supreme Court did mandate that the courts use "a gener-
ous construction"2 02 of the Act to achieve a policy Congress
considered to be of the highest priority. The primary provi-
sions of the law prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing or through conduct that otherwise makes housing un-
available,203 and proscribe discrimination in the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of the sale or rental of housing or in the
services or facilities connected therewith.2 °4 Lower courts ap-
plying the Supreme Court's "generous construction" mandate
have extended these provisions to a range of discriminatory
practices beyond the mere sale or rental of housing, including
racial steering,20 5 race-based appraisal practices,2 °6 redlining,2 0 7
exclusionary zoning and planning,20 public housing site selec-
199. The current version of the Fair Housing Act is the product of two en-
actments: The Civil Rights Act of 1968, The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII, Pub.
L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No.100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. ROBERT G. ScHWEMM, HOusING DISCRIMINATION
LAw AND LITIGATION § 5.1 (1990). The Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989, Supp. II 1990).
200. See KERNER COMM'N, supra note 7.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988). For a discussion of the significance of the Ker-
ner report and the King assassination in averting a filibuster and securing the
Act's passage, see SCHWEMM, supra note 199, § 5.2.
202. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972);
see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982); Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1978).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin).
204. § 3604(b) (1988).
205. See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978).
206. See, e.g., Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072,
1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
207. See, e.g., Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.
Ohio 1976).
208. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1988), review declined in part and judgment aff'd, 488 U.S.
15 (1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert de-
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tion and demolition,209 and discriminatory community develop-
ment activities.210
HUD regulations implementing the 1988 amendments to
the Act now clarify that discrimination in the provision of serv-
ices falls within the coverage of section 3604(b).211 In addition,
the regulations also extend coverage of section 3604(a) to the
disparate provision of municipal services that renders housing
unavailable or less available.212
Significantly, the Fair Housing Act does not require a find-
ing of intentional discrimination to establish a violation.213 The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, but it re-
cently affirmed a decision of the Second Circuit applying a dis-
criminatory impact or effects standard in Huntington Branch
NAACP v. Town of Huntington.21 4 In its per curiam affirm-
ance of Huntington, the Supreme Court at least tacitly ap-
proved an effects standard, stating: "Without endorsing the
precise analysis of the Court of Appeals, we are satisfied on this
record that disparate impact was shown, and that the sole justi-
fication proffered to rebut the prima facie case was inade-
quate."215 In addition, there is no circuit conflict on this point,
nied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
209. See, e.g., Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 776 F. Supp. 637, 641-42 (D.R.I.
1991); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
210. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
aff'd as modified, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).
211. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (1992); see also Concerned Tenants Ass'n
of the Indian Trails Apts. v. Indian Trails Apts., 496 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (finding that disparities in apartment maintenance provided to black-
occupied housing complex constitutes a claim under § 3604(b)). Compare Lar-
ramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(" '[S]ervices or facilities' [in the F.H.A.] refers to 'services generally provided
by governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collec-
tion.' ") with Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424-25 (M.D.
Pa. 1978) (finding police protection too attenuated from housing to permit cov-
erage under the Fair Housing Act).
212. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (1992); see also United States v. Yonkers
Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1291 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[Section 3604(a)] has
been construed to reach 'every practice which has the effect of making hous-
ing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds.' ") (citation omitted), off'd,
837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
213. For discussion of the legislative history of the 1968 and 1988 Acts sup-
porting the application of a discriminatory effects standard, see SCHWEMM,
supra note 199, § 10.4(1); Florence W. Roisman & Philip Tegeler, Improving
and Expanding Housing Opportunities for Poor People of Color, 24 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 312, 315 n.16 (1990).
214. 488 U.S. 15 (per curiam), qffg 844 F.2d. 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
215. Id. at 18; see SCHWEMM, supra note 199, § 13.4(3)(c) (Supreme Court
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with courts in virtually every circuit having approved some ver-
sion of a discriminatory effects standard under the Fair Hous-
ing Act.2 16
Under the leading formulation of the discriminatory effects
standard,2 1 7 the plaintiff has the burden of proving the discrim-
inatory impact or effects from the defendant's conduct. The
affirmance in Huntington "produced a powerful endorsement of the discrimi-
natory effect theory"); James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Act Amendments
of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1075
(1989) (stating that "Huntington presents the Court's most significant tacit en-
dorsement of the Fair Housing Act's prima facie effects test").
216. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied
sub nom City of Hawthorne v. Wright, 493 U.S. 813 (1989); Huntington Branch
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.), review declined in
part and judgment aff'Id, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs.,
736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. City of Parma, 661
F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v.
Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied,
434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); McGrath v.
United States Hous. & Urban Dev., 722 F. Supp. 902, 907 (D. Mass. 1989);
Brown v. Artery Org. Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1115-16 (D.D.C. 1987) (effects
standard only applies to government defendants).
217. Courts of appeals utilize three formulations of the discriminatory ef-
fects standard. The Eighth Circuit, borrowing equal protection concepts, re-
quires defendants, upon a showing of discriminatory effects, to demonstrate
that the challenged conduct serves a compelling interest. See United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185. The Seventh Circuit applies a four-factor
calculus for evaluating whether a defendant's conduct produces impermissible
discriminatory effects. See Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at. 1290. Those factors
are: first, the strength of the showing of discriminatory effect; second,
whether there is some evidence of discriminatory intent though not enough to
satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; third, the strength
of defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and fourth, whether
plaintiff is seeking to compel defendant affirmatively to provide housing to
members of minority groups or merely to restrain defendant from interfering
with the development of such housing. Id. at 1290. The standard utilized by
the Second and Third Circuits and discussed infra is based on the disparate
impact test developed in Title VII cases. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935 (rely-
ing on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 126,
147-48 (same). While the Supreme Court's evisceration of the Griggs standard
in Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) probably did
not have a similar effect on the Title VIII burden of proof, the recent restora-
tion of Griggs through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 105, 193 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991) renders that issue all but moot. See
John M. Payne, Fair Housing for the 1990s: The Fair Housing Amendments
Act and the Ward's Cove Case, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 307, 338-41 (1990) (asserting
that Ward's Cove's modifications to the Griggs standard are employment-spe-
cific and not applicable to the Huntington approach to Title VIII land use mat-
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plaintiff may make a prima facie showing of discriminatory ef-
fects through proof that either the defendant's conduct has a
disparate adverse impact on a protected class,21 8 or the defend-
ant's conduct will have the ultimate effect of perpetuating seg-
regation in the community. 219  Once the plaintiff has
demonstrated discriminatory effects, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to establish both a legitimate and bona fide
justification or purpose the challenged conduct serves and the
absence of less discriminatory alternatives to further that
purpose.220
The less discriminatory alternatives component of this
standard provides a powerful tool for addressing land use dis-
crimination and inequality. Virtually any land use regulation
can be justified by an arguably neutral and legitimate govern-
ment objective.221 Yet many alternative approaches may ac-
complish those governmental objectives with less residential
disruption or degradation in communities of color.222
ters); Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 213, at 322-24; see also 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2(k) (West Supp. 1992) (restoring the Griggs standard to Title VII).
Because the Supreme Court evaluated and did not disapprove the Hunt-
ington standard and because the Second Circuit is apparently the only court of
appeals to consider the propriety of all three standards before selecting the
Third Circuit's test, the Huntington standard probably enjoys the greatest
chance of longevity. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936-39 (analyzing the various
effects standards). For a discussion of the superiority of the Third Circuit's
standard eventually adopted in Huntington, see Robert G. Schwemm, Dis-
criminatory Effects and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 199,
257-58 (1978). Professor Schwemm has also suggested that there may be little
appreciable difference in these standards in application. See SCHWEMM, supra
note 199, § 10.4 (2)(b); cf. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 983-84 & n.13
(11th Cir. 1992) (citing Arlington Heights, Black Jack, and Huntington with
approval).
218. Disparate impact may be proven by showing that a greater number of
the protected class are aggrieved by the challenged conduct, that they are dis-
proportionately affected, or that they have experienced qualitatively greater
harm. See Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 213, at 317-18 (citing cases).
219. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937.
220. Id. at 936.
221. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that a
mandatory referendum requirement for the construction of public housing for
low-income families was justified as a procedure for democratic decision mak-
ing). See generally Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Mu-
nicipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1988) (discussing
the unpredictable nature of inquiry into legislative motive and proposing crite-
ria and guidelines for deciding when courts should evaluate it in municipal
land use regulation).
222. See Crisis Committee, supra note 151, at 89 (finding that the City's
goals of increasing property values and protecting buildings through designa-
tion of gentrification-inducing historic district were "capable in large part of
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In addition, applying analogous precedents under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1 9 6 4 ,2 23 discriminatory conduct that
commenced prior to the Act's passage should have become ac-
tionable on the Act's effective date.2 2 In Bazemore v. Fri-
day,225 the Court specifically held that
[a] pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title
VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, be-
came a violation upon Title VII's effective date, and to the extent an
employer continued to engage in that act or practice, it is liable under
that statute.
2 2 6
As Justice Brennan explained, in reasoning equally applicable
to Title VIII and land use discrimination, "to hold otherwise
would have the effect of exempting from liability those ... who
were historically the greatest offenders of the rights of
blacks."227 It would also perpetuate indefinitely the continuing
destructive consequences of historic discrimination. Applying
this reasoning, service disparities that commenced decades ear-
lier, which were never fully eradicated, and which continue to
diminish the residential well-being of communities of color in
the 1990s should be actionable under the Fair Housing Act.
Those disparities became actionable on the Act's effective date,
and local government's ongoing failure to rectify them consti-
tutes a continuing violation of the Act.2
28
The Bazemore approach provides a framework for address-
ing another significant obstacle in municipal services equaliza-
tion litigation that the Second Circuit identified in Beal v.
being accomplished by less drastic means. .. ."); supra notes 151-56 and accom-
panying text.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to § 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
224. See Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 213, at 327-28 (explaining the rele-
vance of Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam), to a Fair Hous-
ing Act pattern and practice claim).
225. 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
226. Id. at 395 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
227. Id,
228. While the Fair Housing Act only has a two-year statute of limitations,
conduct that continues into the limitation period is actionable. See United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1374 n.72 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding that a challenge to the continuing failure to remedy 30-year pattern of
discriminatory site selection of public housing was not time-barred), ffl'd, 837
F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); United States v. City
of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 573 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that a challenge to 6-year
pattern of exclusionary zoning and planning was not time-barred), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Indian Trails Apts. v.
Indian Trails Apts., 496 F. Supp. 522, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that chal-
lenge to 4-year pattern of providing disparate services and facilities to resi-
dents of black-occupied apartment complex was not time-barred).
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Lindsey.229 In Beal, the court held that equality of service in-
puts, as opposed to outputs or results, satisfied a city's responsi-
bility to provide equality of municipal services.3 0 Hence, the
substandard or poor physical condition of a park in a Puerto Ri-
can and African-American community was not actionable be-
cause the city provided park maintenance inputs at a level
equivalent to that provided for park maintenance in the white
communities. 23' The court concluded that the greater preva-
lence of vandalism, not the city's service allocation, accounted
for the disparities in the relative condition of the parks.232
In situations where the lingering effects of historical dis-
crimination preclude equality of services, notwithstanding
equal or even greater service inputs in communities of color,
Bazemore provides an approach for securing equal services out-
puts by addressing the historical inequalities.2 33 For example,
if a city installed inferior water mains in a minority community
fifty years ago and that community presently receives a dispa-
rate level of water services outputs as a result, the city could be
required to equalize the water mains, or otherwise provide
equivalent water outputs, notwithstanding equal or even
greater water services inputs to the minority community. Simi-
larly, if a city selected a minority community to shoulder a dis-
parate burden of environmentally undesirable uses and
attempted to justify its sitings based on the greater relative
"suitability" of the community for such uses, plaintiffs could
compel the city to remedy the lingering effects of the historic
discriminatory zoning and planning practices that rendered the
community less residentially suitable in the first instance.234
229. 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972); see HAAR & WoLF, supra note 5, at 660
suggesting the equality of input defense from Beal is a significant obstacle to
federal relief in equalization cases); Rossum, supra note 194, at 68-69 (same).
230. Beal, 468 F.2d at 290-91.
231. 1d. at 291-92.
232. Id.
233. This approach derives at least implicit support from the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Beal. See id. at 290 (finding no duty to attain equal results
from services when equal input of services is provided where "the factor re-
quiring added effort is not the result of past illegal action").
234. Under the Huntington standard, the city would also have to prove
that its purportedly neutral justification-the siting of LULUs in environmen-
tally suitable locations-could not be accomplished through less discriminatory
alternatives. See supra note 127 (suggesting approaches for averting the "envi-
ronmental suitability" defense asserted in R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay and East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n).
Other obstacles to land use and services equalization litigation remain. Where
there are "invincible physical impediments" and, thus, no less discriminatory
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Houston v. City of Cocoa illustrates the potential value of
the Fair Housing Act in addressing long term historic and pres-
ent day land use inequality.2 3 -5 In highlighting the ongoing en-
vironmental intrusions stemming from the defendants' historic
discriminatory incompatible zoning, the plaintiffs alleged that
"heavy commercial zoning has caused: first, the intrusion of ga-
rages, auto body shops, machine shops and other uses incompat-
ible with the homes and apartments in the neighborhood;
second, the replacement of many homes by those business uses;
and third, the displacement of black residents from their
homes."2 36 The plaintiffs claimed that the "City's long-term
heavy commercial zoning of the Neighborhood has diminished
the quality and safety of the area and has injured Plaintiffs by
bringing loud noises, noxious odors, ugly and blighted appear-
ances and increased traffic to a formerly peaceful and residen-
tial community. '23 7 In seeking a remedy for the entirety of the
city's practices under the Fair Housing Act, plaintiffs alleged
that the city's conduct "serve[d] to perpetuate the results of a
long history of racial discrimination by the City against black
residents of the neighborhood."2 3 8
The virtually all-black community suffered obvious adverse
impacts from the city's destructive zoning and planning prac-
tices. In addition, both the incompatible commercial zoning
and the gentrification-inducing rezoning resulted in increasing
segregation by displacing plaintiffs from the only section of
black-occupied housing on the white side of the railroad tracks,
alternatives to a contested allocation of services, a challenge would fail. See
HAAR & FFSSLER, supra note 195, at 260-61 n.20. A suit would also be pre-
cluded where the disparities or disruptions in the residential environment are
entirely attributable to the acts of non-governmental third parties. Cf Beal,
468 F.2d at 289-91; Marcuse, supra note 135, at 1358 ("displacement by tor-
nado" does not ordinarily create a right of action against government). Fi-
nally, the absence of sufficient statistical evidence of service disparities would
preclude the demonstration of a prima facie violation of the Act. Cf Bean v.
Southwestern Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (no dispar-
ities in the siting of solid waste facilities); Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp.
44, 52 (D.D.C. 1975) (no "significant difference" in the levels of various munici-
pal services provided to black and white communities). These types of obsta-
cles are present in virtually all categories of pattern and practice civil rights
litigation.
235. Houston v. City of Cocoa, 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) V 15,625
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss); see
supra notes 141-150 and accompanying text (discussing City of Cocoa).
236. Complaint 1 80, City of Cocoa (No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19).
237. I& % 82.
238. Id- q 95. Plaintiffs also challenged both the adverse impact and segre-
gative ultimate effects of the city's conduct. Id. 1 82-96.
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resulting potentially in the loss of one-sixth of the city's black
population.2s 9 In denying defendants' motion to dismiss, the
district court found the contested long-term denial of protective
zoning actionable under both sections 3604(a) and (b) of the
Fair Housing Act.240
Ultimately, the suit settled and the community obtained re-
lief designed to remedy most of the challenged conduct and to
secure a right to protective zoning for the indefinite future.m
This relief included a protective rezoning to reflect the low-
density residential character of the neighborhood, to phase out
existing incompatible uses over time,242 and to provide inclusio-
nary incentives for the development of affordable new housing
in the neighborhood.243 The settlement also permanently en-
joined any future zoning or planning action that has either the
239. Id. % 92; see also Id. 31-33, 91.
240. See City of Cocoa, 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 15,625, at
16,206-10; see also supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text (describing
§ 3604(a)-(b)). Because the city's redevelopment plans utilized federal Com-
munity Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, the Court also found that
the plaintiffs stated claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in federally funded pro-
grams) and under the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA) of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (prohibiting discrimination in the
CDBG program). City of Cocoa, 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) % 15,625,
at 16,210-12. Regulations implementing these laws prohibit conduct which has
either the purpose or the effect of discriminating on the basis of race. See 24
C.F.R. §§ 1.4(b)(2)(i), 570.602(b)(2) (1992); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 591-93 (1983) (recognizing appli-
cability of discriminatory effects standard under Title VI's implementing regu-
lations but not under Title VI alone). The regulations also impose affirmative
obligations on recipients of funds to take reasonable action to overcome the
consequences of past discrimination and in the CDBG program, to promote
fair housing. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.4(b)(6), 570.602(b)(4), 601(b).
241. See Settlement of Florida Zoning Case Includes Housing Rehabilita-
tion, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) [Bulletin], May 1, 1991, 11.3 (report-
ing final judgment in City of Cocoa).
242. Prior to approving the final settlement, the court dismissed a com-
plaint in intervention by white business owners which had challenged the resi-
dential rezoning provisions. Id Observing that the settlement grandfathered
existing uses and terminated the right to commercial use only upon abandon-
ment or conversion to other use, the Court held that the rezoning was not
"confiscatory." See City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. Oct 16,
1980) (order denying motion to intervene and to stay issuance of final
judgment).
243. Consent Decree, City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. July
25, 1990). The new zoning borrowed the concepts from the gentrification-in-
ducing prior zoning-density bonuses and transferable development rights-to
provide market incentives for the development of new affordable housing.
Developers who constructed or rehabilitated an affordable housing unit in the
neighborhood would be rewarded with the authorization to build additional
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purpose or effect of involuntarily displacing the plaintiffs from
the neighborhood or of "substantially undermining the quality
of the residential environment." 2 "
C. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Under Washington v. Davis the complaining party's bur-
den of proof was elevated to require a showing of intentional
discrimination in cases under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause,245 but that burden has not proven in-
surmountable in cases relating to municipal services, 2 " exclu-
sionary zoning,247 or public housing discrimination.248 A year
after Washington v. Davis, the Court addressed the application
of its "new" intent standard to municipal land use issues in Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.2 9 Arlington Heights demonstrated the Court's
resolve to extend this more stringent standard beyond the em-
ployment discrimination context of Washington v. Davis. In
applying this standard to land use issues, however, the Court
also clarified that explicit racial classifications or "smoking
gun" evidence would not be required to support a finding of in-
square footage in the valuable central business district. Id.; cf supra note 137
and accompanying text (discussing gentrification).
244. Consent Decree, Parts II, V & VI, City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-
19. Additionally, the settlement provided a $675,000 housing rehabilitation
fund for low-income homeowners and an award of $20,000 in damages for the
named plaintiffs. Settlement of Florida Zoning Case Includes Housing Reha-
bilitation, supra note 241.
245. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
246. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (en banc); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983);
Baker v. City of Kissemmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Johnson v. City
of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
247. See, e.g., Atkins v. Robinson, 733 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1984); Smith v.
Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. City of
Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir.) (finding intentional discrimination under
the FHA while applying equal protection precedents), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
821 (1984).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir.
1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Walker v. United States Dep't of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Young v. Pierce, 628 F.
Supp. 1037 (E.D. Tex. 1985). In both Walker and Young, plaintiffs proved in-
tentional discrimination on motions for summary judgment. In both cases,
plaintiffs' counsel have remarked that in the context of public housing policy,
"evidence of past and present purposeful racial discrimination is painful to
look at, but it is not hard to find." Julian & Daniel, supra note 64, at 670.
249. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For reference to the Seventh Circuit's decision ap-
plying the Fair Housing Act on remand, see supra note 217.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:739
tentional discrimination (at least in future cases).25°
As a preliminary matter, the Court held that intentional
discrimination can be established even where race is only one
of several factors motivating a defendant's conduct. Recogniz-
ing that governmental entities rarely render decisions moti-
vated by a single concern, or even a dominant or primary one,
the Court found that "racial discrimination is not just another
competing consideration."'21 Evidence that race played any
part in motivating the defendant's conduct shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant to establish that "the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered."252
Lower courts applying this standard in land use cases have
also agreed that proof of racial animosity, ill will, or evil motive
on behalf of public officials is not necessary to support a finding
of discriminatory intent.253 Even conduct motivated by seem-
ingly neutral financial goals such as preserving property val-
ues,2M enhancing the municipal tax base,2ss or maximizing
profit2- can include elements of invidious intent. Additionally,
250. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-68; see Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d
1358, 1363 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing that one cannot expect to find a
"smoking gun" in discrimination cases), qffl'd, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). On the
merits of the Arlington Heights case, the Supreme Court determined that
plaintiffs failed to prove intentional discrimination, even though the record
contained at least two types of circumstantial evidence identified by the Court
as probative of discriminatory intent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-71.
251. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
252. I& at 271 n.21.
253. E.g., Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1414 (11th Cir. 1984);
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City
of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 586 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Ammons v. Dade City,
594 F. Supp. 1274, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1984), qff'd per curiam, 783 F.2d 982 (11th
Cir. 1986) (en banc).
254. In United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819, (E.D. Mich.
1982), the court stated:
A person who attempts to prevent a black family from buying the
house next door because the presence of a black family on the block
will decrease property values violates the Fair Housing Act just as as-
suredly as a person who attempts to prevent a black family from buy-
ing the house next door because that person dislikes all black people.
Id. at 830.
255. See, e.g., Crisis Committee, supra note 151, at 84-90 (finding that his-
toric district designation which will increase property values, raise tax assess-
ments, and promote the displacement of low- and moderate-income African-
American families violates the Equal Protection Clause).
256. Cf Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974) (holding that intentional exploitation of discrimi-
natory housing market for financial gain amounts to illegal discrimination);
Biown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1117-18 (D.D.C. 1987) (conclud-
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evidence showing that governmental planning practices were
designed to create the image that persons of color are unwel-
come supports a finding of discriminatory intent.257
The Court in Arlington Heights also held that a finding of
discriminatory intent may be predicated on circumstantial evi-
dence.258 It articulated six categories of evidence probative of
discriminatory intent: first, the discriminatory impact of the
defendant's decision; second, the historical background of the
decision;259 third, the sequence of events leading up to the deci-
ing that low-income black and hispanic tenants' allegations of intentional dis-
crimination supported preliminary injunction against evictions despite asserted
economic objectives for renovating apartment complex).
257. See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1097 (N.D. Ohio
1980) ("The City of Parma has consistently made decisions which have perpet-
uated and reinforced its image as a city where blacks are not welcome. This is
the very essence of a pattern and practice of racial discrimination."), aff'd in
relevant part, 661 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1982); cfi
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 623 F. Supp. 782, 787-88 (D.D.C. 1985)
(finding that maintenance of all-white residential community through devices
such as "advertising and marketing directed exclusively to white buyers, and
racial steering," are "valid evidence of discriminatory purpose in voting rights
action"), off'd, 479 U.S. 462 (1987). Thus, selective marketing of a community
undergoing substantial gentrification could support a finding of discriminatory
intent.
258. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977). In Brown, Judge Harold Greene explained:
In this day and age, when racial discrimination is no longer as fashion-
able as it was a generation or two ago, racists are more cautious than
they used to be, and for that reason it is now more difficult to provide
direct or conclusive proof of discriminatory intent. The law would be
as blind as the mythical figure of justice if it did not take account of
that reality, rejecting the use of circumstantial evidence of intent.
Brown, 654 F. Supp. at 1117 n.26. In Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055,
1064 (4th Cir. 1982), the court stated:
Municipal officials . . . seldom, if ever, announce on the record that
they are pursuing a particular course of action because of their desire
to discriminate against a racial minority.... It is only in private con-
versation, with individuals assumed to share their bigotry, that open
statements of discrimination are made, so it is rare that these state-
ments can be captured for the purposes of proving racial
discrimination....
259. Among the reasons intentional discrimination in landfill siting could
not be proven in one recent case was the district court's conclusion that histor-
ical evidence of discrimination by city agencies other than the planning and
zoning commission-the agency responsible for landfill siting-was irrelevant
to the issue of intent. See East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-
Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga.
1989), qff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989). This conclusion is contrary to deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and numerous other courts,
that have found evidence of discrimination in a governmental defendant's
other agencies or extending to other distinct practices is relevant and proba-
tive evidence of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
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sion; fourth, departures from the normal procedural processes;
fifth, departures from normal substantive criteria; and sixth,
the legislative and administrative history of discrimination.260
The Court's analysis underscored the importance of proof
of discriminatory impact to a finding of intent. Although the
Court reaffirmed the holding of Washington v. Davis that im-
pact alone does not establish discriminatory intent, it recog-
nized that under certain circumstances little else would be
required. Demonstration of a particularly "stark" or extreme
showing of disparate impact, coupled with the absence of a
credible non-discriminatory explanation for the disparity,
would, without more, justify finding intentional
discrimination.2 61
Later in the same term, the Court supplied additional rea-
soning and support for this limited discriminatory effects stan-
dard, stating: "If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is
unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary one must conclude that ra-
cial or other class-related factors entered into the selection pro-
cess." 262 This approach has been adopted in municipal services
cases.
263
In addition, lower courts applying Arlington Heights have
provided an analogous twist on this standard, holding that the
quantum of other evidence required to demonstrate discrimina-
tory intent relates inversely to the magnitude of the discrimina-
tory impact proven.264 This quantum of other evidence also
624-26 (1982) (holding that history of discrimination in education, employment,
and grand jury selection is probative of intentional voting discrimination); Am-
mons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 988 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming
trial court's reliance on historical evidence of discrimination "covering practi-
cally every aspect of municipal conduct in Dade City throughout its history" to
support a finding of intentional discrimination in municipal services); Whit-
field v. Oliver, 399 F. Supp. 348, 355-57 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (finding historical dis-
crimination in public employment, voting, jury selection, and education
relevant to proving intentional discrimination in the provision of welfare bene-
fits), aff'd, 431 U.S. 910 (1977).
260. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
261. Id at 266.
262. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 n.13 (1977).
263. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1301 (M.D. Fla.
1984) (holding that substantial municipal services disparities raise inference of
discriminatory intent under Castaneda), aff'd per curiam, 783 F.2d 982 (11th
Cir. 1986) (en banc); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (M.D.
Fla. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983).
264. See, e.g., Brown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 (D.D.C.
1987); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
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diminishes where the discriminatory effect is foreseen or
foreseeable. 26
16th Census Tract Crisis Committee v. City of Alexan-
dria 266 cogently illustrates the application of the foregoing
equal protection principles to the problem of disparate zoning
protection. In Crisis Committee, HUD's Office of Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity found that the city's gentrification-in-
ducing ordinance, which designated a historic district in a low-
income African-American community, violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.267 The Agency first determined that the magni-
tude of the impact would be substantial: the analysis of
relevant data revealed substantial African-American residential
displacement had occurred and that the displacees were "nearly
totally" replaced by white residents. 268
The Committee also observed that while the city's "sole, or
even paramount" motivation was not racial discrimination, the
development plans were specifically intended to "displace low
and moderate income blacks" from the Census tract.269 The
disparate expulsive consequences of the city's conduct were
both foreseeable and foreseen by the city, which had earlier
considered and rejected an approach for mitigating the displace-
ment from the increased repair costs.2 70 City officials also
knew of the racial composition of the potential displacees be-
cause the affected African-American community vigorously op-
posed the ordinance on the ground that it would likely produce
race-based dislocation.27' Lastly, the Agency determined that
the weakness of the purposes that the city asserted for the ordi-
nance-the preservation of property values and protection of a
few buildings-coupled with the availability of less discrimina-
tory alternatives to accomplish those purposes, provided fur-
ther circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.272
The federal courts' broad remedial power to redress consti-
tutional violations also provides an approach for remedying the
continuing effects of historic land use discrimination.2 73 In lan-
265. Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186; Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp.
571, 587-88 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); Ammons, 783 F.2d at 982.
266. Crisis Committee, supra note 151.
267. Id at 90.
268. Id at 85.
269. Id
270. Id. at 86.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 86-88.
273. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976); United States v.
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guage that is now commonplace in remedial decrees, the
Supreme Court has charged the lower courts with "not merely
the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well
as bar like discrimination in the future."274 The sweeping lan-
guage of several decrees equalizing municipal services which
apply the Court's remedial mandate furnish a firm basis for se-
curing a right to equality of zoning protection.275
D. THE THITEENTH AMENDMENT
The Thirteenth Amendment 276 arguably provides an alter-
native constitutional basis for addressing land use discrimina-
tion. In City of Memphis v. Greene,277 the Supreme Court left
open the question of whether section 1 of the Thirteenth
Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S.
1055 (1988); Walker v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.
Supp. 1231, 1238 (N.D. Tex. 1989); cf Ayers v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992)
(reaffirming the duty to disestablish the lingering effects of historic discrimi-
nation in higher education); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (upholding
order requiring government authorities to raise $100 million dollars to fund
compensatory enrichment programs in public schools to remedy historic
school segregation). See generally Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Dis.
crimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1983) (targeting remedial efforts at acts
that perpetuate past racial discrimination). A recently filed "environmental
racism" suit has applied these principles to challenge and seek a remedy for a
pattern of releases of hazardous substances in Dallas's communities of color
originating in 1930. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, T% 62-70, West
Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States, No. CA-3-91-2615-R (N.D.
Tex. filed May 28, 1992).
274. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); see, e.g., United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183 (1987) (employing cited language in em-
ployment discrimination remedy); see also Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (relying on power of the courts to fashion
remedial decrees in a school desegregation case).
275. See Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 1984),
off'd per curiam, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court stated:
The ultimate relief to which plaintiffs are entitled is, of course, actual
and complete equality in the receipt of municipal services from the
City.... The municipal services available to the residents of the
black community should be on par with, and entirely equal to, the
municipal services and facilities available to residents of the white
sections of town. The first step in reaching this goal is the elimina-
tion of the effects of past discrimination in the provision of municipal
services.
See also Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (M.D. Fla. 1981)
(using identical language), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City
of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 589-90 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (using similar
language).
276. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
277. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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Amendment applies to "badges and incidents of slavery" or
merely to the institution of slavery and involuntary servi-
tude.278 The lower courts have provided some support for the
broader proposition.27 9  Whether or not section 1 reaches
"badges and incidents," legislation enacted pursuant to section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1982,280
does.281
Under a "badges and incidents" approach, a long-term, per-
vasive, or significantly disruptive practice of land use discrimi-
nation should be actionable.282 For example, in Houston v. City
of Cocoa,283 the plaintiffs alleged that the city's long-term pat-
tern of destructive land use in the African-American commu-
nity dated back as far as the 1920s.284 Plaintiffs argued that
this conduct reflected the post-reconstruction subjugation of
black property rights and derived its genesis from slave code
prohibitions on the ownership of land or personal property.215
The district court held that these allegations stated a claim
under section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment based on a
"badges and incidents" analysis and under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as a
discriminatory restriction on black property rights.28 6
278. 1I at 125-26.
279. See, e.g., Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160
(9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment is an "affirmative dec-
laration that all vestiges of slavery would be illegal"); Pennsylvania v. Local
Union No. 542., Int'l of Operating Eng'r, 347 F. Supp. 268, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(stating that purpose of Thirteenth Amendment extends to eradicating
"badges and incidents of slavery"), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973).
280. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1988)). In Greene, the Supreme Court also left open the question whether
§ 1982 requires proof of intentional discrimination. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 120.
281. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) ("Congress
has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what
are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that de-
termination into effective legislation.").
282. Cf. Greene, 451 U.S. at 128-29 (deciding that the closing of one street in
a black neighborhood presented a mere "inconvenience" to the community
which did not rise to the level of a badge or incident of slavery).
283. Houston v. City of Cocoa, 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 15,625
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 1989) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
284. Complaint 31, City of Cocoa (No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19).
285. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Mo-
tion to Dismiss at 17, City of Cocoa (No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19) (stating "slaves
have no legal rights of property in things, real or personal") (citing GEORGE M.
STRouD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAvERY 12 (1968)).
286. See City of Cocoa, 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 15,625; see also
Calmore, supra note 15, at 242 (suggesting that the badge of slavery analysis be
extended to discriminatory practices which perpetuate blacks' poverty status).
But cf. Geri J. Yonover, Comment, Dead End Street Discrimination, The
Thirteenth Amendmen4 and Section 1982, 58 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 873, 904
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E. THE POLICE POWER-SUBSTANTIE DUE PROCESS
Low-income communities of color that are unable to secure
land use equity through anti-discrimination law might find lim-
ited solace in the substantive due process limits on the police
power. As a general matter, the judicial standards governing
the substantive review of police power enactments mandate ex-
treme deference to municipal objectives.2s 7 There are, how-
ever, circumstances under which a city's damaging zoning or
planning conduct justifies greater skepticism. 28 8 For example,
the use of incompatible zoning to depress land values and de-
crease the cost of government acquisition warrants no similar
deference to the asserted municipal objectives.2s 9
Furthermore, Euclid demonstrates that the Court recog-
nizes the importance of protecting residential communities and
the residential environment from the negative by-products of
industrialization and commercial development. Thus, the
(1982) (commenting on the effect of Greene that "lt]he dead end street in
Memphis will have a deadening effect on judicial resolution of racial discrimi-
nation"). See generally G. Sidney Buchanan et al., The Quest For Freedom: A
Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 331, 357, 593,
610, 844, 871, 1070 (1975) (outlining development and enforcement of Thir-
teenth Amendment).
287. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)
(zoning ordinances are constitutional unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasona-
ble, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare"). See generally Daniel J. Mandelker, Revising the Presumption
of Constitutionality in Land Use Litigation" Is Legislative Action Necessary?,
30 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1986) (asserting that the presumption
of constitutionality for land use regulations may require reversal in cases af-
fecting fundamental rights and insular minorities, but not in cases involving
developers); Keith R. Denny, Note, That Old Due Process Magic: Growth Con-
trol and the Federal Constitution, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1245, 1249-58 (1990) (argu-
ing that due process analysis is wrongheaded for growth control ordinances).
288. The Court's recent reinvigoration of the Fifth Amendment's Taking
Clause portends less deference to local land use regulation in the future. See,
e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (holding
that land use regulation must substantially advance legitimate state interests).
See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the
Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian
Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. CoLo. L. REV.
427, 429-33 (1988) (discussing heightened judicial scrutiny of land use regula-
tions in rescent takings cases); Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nol-
lan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627 (1988) (advocating strong judicial review
of land use regulations).
289. See Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal
Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 67-74 (1988); Bruce W. Bur-
ton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of
Constitutionality in the Wake of the Takings Trilogy, 44 ARK. L. REV. 65, U9-
20 (1991).
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Court in Euclid found that it is manifestly within the general
welfare to protect residential communities from the dangers
and degradations of blighting or disruptive uses. ° Conversely,
police power enactments that substantially undermine these ba-
sic Euclidean principles by authorizing the intrusion of such
uses should, at a minimum, be subject to a diminished presump-
tion of validity.291
Additionally, the state courts'292 emerging heightened rec-
ognition of governments' police power responsibilities to plan
for the housing needs of low- and moderate-income families 293
provides further support for a right to protective zoning in low-
income communities. The leading manifestations of this trend
at the state level are the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions
in Mt. Laurel 1294 and Mt. Laurel 11.295 In Mt. Laurel I, the
290. For discussion of the modern-day Supreme Court's recognition of the
importance of protective zoning, see supra note 46.
291. Cf. Harris v. Skirving, 248 P.2d 408, 411 (Wash. 1952) (granting an in-
junction against a garbage dump that is a nuisance and is "inherently obnox-
ious in a residential area" notwithstanding its consistency with the City's
zoning ordinance). See generally Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n of East Hampton, 545 A.2d 530, 539 (Conn. 1988) (zoning that pro-
motes legitimate zoning goals but also has effects contrary to the public wel-
fare should be subjected to closer judicial scrutiny); Mt Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713,
731-32 (N.J.) ("municipalities must zone primarily for the living welfare of
people and not for the benefit of the local tax rate"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975).
292. Exclusionary zoning is one of the areas in which state courts, applying
state police power and substantive due process provisions, have exceeded the
federal minima in protecting individual rights. See, e.g., Mt Laurel I, 336 A.2d
at 725. See generally William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tions of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (imploring state courts
seeking broad construction of constitutional principles to avert United States
Supreme Court reversal by predicating decisions on parallel state constitu-
tional provisions); Stanley Mosk, The Law of the Next Century: The State
Courts, in AMmEICAN LAW: THE THmD CENTURY 213 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1976) (describing with approval the trend of state courts to rely on their re-
spective constitutions).
293. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City
of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 487-90 (Cal. 1976); Builders Serv. Corp., 545 A.2d at
546-47; Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 495-96 (N.H. 1991); Mt Laurel
II, 456 A.2d 390, 462 (N.J. 1983); Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 730. Compare Beren-
son v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241-42 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that
zoning must be consistent with a well-ordered plan to meet the community's
present and future housing needs) with Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 527
N.E.2d 265, 272-73 (N.Y. 1988) (finding that city's substantial overall planning
for low-income housing needs preclude challenge to failure to mitigate dis-
placement in fourteen-block area). See generally Roisman & Tegeler, supra
note 213, at 343-51.
294. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
295. 456 A.2d. 390 (N.J. 1987).
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New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a township's zoning
provisions that had erected virtually insurmountable barriers to
residential access for low- and moderate-income families.2
Finding these "parochial" devices violative of the general wel-
fare, the court imposed affirmative responsibilities on the town-
ship and other developing municipalities to employ land use
regulations that provide a realistic opportunity for meeting a
"fair share" of the region's present and prospective low- and
moderate-income housing needs. 29 7
Frustrated with the slow pace of compliance with this man-
date, the court in Mt. Laurel II broadened municipalities' obli-
gations by requiring their performance of affirmative
inclusionary measures to ensure the provision of low- and mod-
erate-income housing.298 Significantly, the court also extended
these affirmative obligations to developed municipalities and, in
so doing, provided a principle for addressing land use inequality
in low-income communities through the substantive review of
land use controls. It noted that "the State controls the use of
land, all of the land. In exercising that control it cannot favor
rich over poor. It cannot legislatively set aside dilapidated
housing in urban ghettos for the poor and decent housing else-
where for everyone else."299 The court recognized that a mu-
nicipality's "zoning power is no more abused by keeping out the
region's poor than by forcing out the resident poor."300
It remains to be seen whether the New Jersey Supreme
Court's expansive interpretation of the substantive limits on
the police power will be widely followed in other states. Never-
theless, the Mt. Laurel If approach provides further support for
a right to land use regulation designed to improve the quality of
the residential environment and avert involuntary displace-
ment in low-income communities of color.30 '
296. Mt Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 729-34. The township's practices included
substantial overzoning for industrial uses, costly minimum lot size and house
size requirements, and the exclusion of multi-family housing. Id. at 718-24.
297. Id at 732-33.
298. Mt Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 442-52.
299. Id. at 415.
300. Id at 418. The court also stated that "[e]very municipality's land use
regulations should provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing for at
least some part of its resident poor who now occupy dilapidated housing." Id.
301. For discussion of the potential applications of ML Laurel II to zoning
and land use issues within developed municipalities' low-income communities
see Steve Dobkin et al., Zoning for the General Welfare: A Constitutional
Weapon for Lower-Income Tenants, 13 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 911,
917-24 (1984-85); Harold McDougall, Mount Laurel II and the Revitalizing
City, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 667 (1984); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Ur-
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CONCLUSION
The persistence of stark patterns of residential segregation
in the 1990s serves as a reminder of this country's legacy of sys-
tematic discrimination in land use policy. At the same time,
new and insidious forms of land use assaults-ranging from the
disparate siting of toxic waste facilities to the stimulation of
foreseeable race-based gentrification-pose unprecedented risks
to the survival and integrity of low-income communities of
color. Both new and recycled legal approaches offer the poten-
tial for reinvigorating community improvement and equaliza-
tion litigation efforts to remedy historic and modern-day land
use inequalities. These and other nonlitigation efforts are nec-
essary to provide long overdue fulfillment of the congressional
promise of a suitable living environment for all American fami-
lies30 2 and to return Justice Sutherland's proverbial pig from
the "hood" to the barnyard once and for all.
ban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 333, 361-79
(1984).
302. See 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
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